How to Choose a Constitutional Theory by Fallon, Richard Henry
 
How to Choose a Constitutional Theory
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87
Calif. L. Rev. 535 (1999).
Published Version http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol87/iss3
/2/
Accessed February 16, 2015 5:28:16 PM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12956282
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAACalifornia Law Review
Volume 87|Issue 3 Article 2
May 1999
How to Choose a Constitutional Theory
Richard H. Fallon Jr.
Follow this and additional works at:http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the California Law Review at Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in California Law Review by an authorized administrator of Berkeley Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
jcera@law.berkeley.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. Fallon Jr.,How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 535 (1999).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol87/iss3/2How to Choose  a
Constitutional Theory
Richard H. Falon, Jr.t
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...............................................................................................  537
I.  The  Inherently Value-Laden  Choice Between Text-Based
and Practice-Based Theories ..............................................................  540
A.  The Nature of Constitutional Theories ........................................  540
1.  Text-Based Theories .............................................................  541
2.  Practice-Based Theories ........................................................  542
3.  Blurring the Distinction ........................................................  544
B.  The Limits of Positivism .............................................................  545
II.  Three Shared Evaluative Criteria .......................................................  549
A.  Text-Based Theories ....................................................................  551
B.  Practice-Based Theories ..............................................................  554
C.  Continuing  Disagreement  and  an Agenda  for Further
A nalysis .......................................................................................  557
D.  Assessing the Prevailing Criteria ................................................  558
1.  The Relevance of the Prevailing Criteria ..............................  558
2.  Other Criteria ........................................................................  559
III.  Formal Theories,  Substantive Criteria, and the Pertinence of
Who Occupies the Bench ...................................................................  562
A.  Substantive and Formal Theories ................................................  562
B.  Historical Contingency and Constitutional Theory .....................  568
C.  Meeting an Objection ..................................................................  570
IV. Who Needs Constitutional Theory? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 572
A.  The Perils of Pragmatism ............................................................  573
B.  Do Judges Need Constitutional Theory? .....................................  574
Copyright © 1999 California Law Review, Inc.
t  Professor of Law, Harvard University. I have benefitted from comments by Sharon Dolovich,
Dan Farber, Joel Goldstein, Larry Lessig, Joe Liu, Dan Meltzer, Frank Michelman, Henry Monaghan,
Connie Rosati, Larry Sager, Fred Schauer, David Shapiro, and participants in legal theory workshops at
Harvard Law School and at the School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).536  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 87:535
V.  Questions on the Agenda ...................................................................  576
A.  Who Should Choose? ..................................... .............................  576
B.  What Are the Appropriate Time Horizons? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 578
Conclusion ................................................................................................  579HOW TO CHOOSE  A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
How to Choose  a
Constitutional Theory
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
People concerned about constitutional  law confront a large number
of competing constitutional theories, which offer conflicting accounts of
how judges should interpret and apply the  Constitution. Assessment of
such theories needs to be based partly on normative grounds. Moreover,
there is a surprising  degree of implicit agreement among constitutional
theorists about the criteria that a constitutional  theory ought to satisfy.
Besides 'fitting" either  the text of the written Constitution or surrounding
constitutional  practice, constitutional  theories should be judged based on
their capacity to (i) maintain the rule of law, (ii)  preserve  fair  opportunity
for political  democracy, and (iii)  protect a morally and politically accept-
able set of substantive rights. Determining which constitutional theory
would best  promote these goals requires  a partly instrumental  calculation,
including an assessment of who our judges and Justices are likely to be.
Nonetheless, the need to select a theory on instrumental  grounds does not
justify unprincipled,  case-by-case manipulation.  A good constitutional  the-
ory should impose constraints  on those who accept it.
INTRODUCTION
Anyone who cares about constitutional law confronts a large and pro-
liferating  number of constitutional  theories,  by which  I  mean  theories
about the nature of the United States Constitution  and how judges should
interpret  and apply it.1  On the surface,  the competing  theories  not only
1.  Cf. Richard  A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73  N.Y.U. L.  REv.  1,  1  (1998)
("Constitutional theory, as I shall use the term, is the effort to develop  a generally accepted  theory to
guide the interpretation  of the Constitution  of the United States."). A by no means exhaustive  list of
prominent examples of constitutional theories  includes those advanced by  1 BRUCE  ACKERMAN,  WE
THE PEOPLE  (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN,  WE THE PEOPLE (1998);  RAOUL BERGER,  GOVERNMENT  BY
JUDICIARY  (1977); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962);  PHILIP BoBrrr,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION  (1991);  ROBERT  H. BORK,  THE TEMPTING  OF  AMERICA  (1990);
JESSE  H.  CHOPER,  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  AND  THE  NATIONAL  POLITICAL  PROCESS  (1980);  RONALD
DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW  (1996)  [hereinafter  DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW]; RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW'S  EMPIRE  (1986)  [hereinafter DWORKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE]; JOHN  HART  ELY,  DEMOCRACY  AND
DISTRUST (1980);  RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,  TAKINGS:  PRIVATE  PROPERTY  AND  THE POWER  OF EMINENT
DOMAIN  (1985);  DAVID  A.J. RICHARDS,  TOLERATION  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION (1986);  LAURENCE H.
TRIBE  &  MICHAEL  C.  DORF,  ON  READING  THE  CONSTITUTION  (1991);  HARRY  H. WELLINGTON,
INTERPRETING  THE CONSTITUTION  (1990); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity  in Translation,  71  TEx. L. REv.
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assert diverse substantive  claims,  but also  appear to make  different  as-
sumptions  about the criteria  that a constitutional  theory  ought to  satisfy.
For example,  some text-based theories  claim validity  on the ground that
they "fit" the written Constitution uniquely well.'  By contrast, what I call
"practice-based theories"  assert their superiority because they better fit or
explain a constitutional "practice"  in which judges sometimes decide cases
based on considerations that go beyond the constitutional text?
A second divide among constitutional theories separates those that are
"substantive" from those that are more "formal" or "methodological."  Sub-
stantive theories seek to identify  substantive values that constitutional  ad-
judication  ought  to  advance.  Examples  include  theories  that  call  for
decision making  to promote natural law4 or Rawlsian liberalism  In  con-
trast,  formal  theories  prescribe  methodologies  that  should  be  used  in
constitutional decision making, but do not purport to identify  substantive
values by which  outcomes  should be tested.6  For example, "originalists"
maintain that courts  should generally interpret constitutional language  to
accord with the "original understanding" of those who wrote and ratified it,
regardless of the substantive values that the original understanding might
reflect.
7
Given the variety of constitutional theories, and perhaps especially the
divergent methodological  assumptions  that appear to  lie behind them, by
what criteria should anyone choose which theory, or which type of theory,
to embrace?  In seeking  to answer this question, I advance four principal
claims in this Article. First, as I argue in Part I, the choice of a constitu-
tional theory must be based at least partly on considerations that are exter-
nal to the constitutional  text. The written Constitution,  by itself, cannot
determine the correctness  of any particular theory of constitutional inter-
pretation.  Selection  must reflect  a judgment about which  theory  would
yield the best outcomes, as measured against relevant criteria.
1165  (1993); Frank  Michelman, Law's Republic, 97  YALE  L.J.  1493,  1520  (1988);  and  David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional  Interpretation,  63 U. Cm. L. REv. 877 (1996).
2.  See, e.g.,  BORK,  supra note  1, at  1-5  (urging judges  not to  stray beyond  the text of  the
Constitution  in deciding constitutional  issues);  id. at  143-44 (defending  interpretation  based  on the
"original  understanding" of constitutional language because of its fit with the constitutional  text); ELY,
supra note 1, at 87-101 (arguing that his "representation-reinforcement"  theory fits the constitutional
text uniquely well).
3.  See, e.g.,  1 ACKERMAN,  supra note 1, at 22;  id. at 34  (referring to  the Constitution as  an
"evolving"  historical  practice);  DWORKIN,  FREEDOM's  LAW, supra  note  1, at  10;  DWORKIN,  LAW's
EmPIRE, supra  note 1, at 254-58, 397-99.
4.  See EPsTEiN, supra  note 1, at 304-05  (arguing for a "natural law account of property that is
able to resist legislative nullification").
5.  See RicHARUs,  supra  note 1, at 12,57-58, 61-62.
6.  See Posner, supra  note 1, at 7-8 (drawing a similar distinction).
7.  See, e.g.,  BORK, supra  note 1, at 144-55;  ANTONIN  SCALIA,  A MATTER  OF INTERPRETATION
38-47 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
[Vol. 87:535HOW TO CHOOSE A CONSTITUIONAL  THEORY
Second,  there is a  surprising  degree  of implicit  agreement  among
constitutional  theorists about the criteria that a sound constitutional theory
ought to satisfy. Part II shows that theorists both widely and correctly rec-
ognize that the choice among theories  should be based  on which theory
will best advance shared,  though vague and sometimes  competing, goals
of:  (i) satisfying the requirements  of the rule of law, (ii) preserving fair
opportunity for majority rule under  a scheme of political democracy,  and
(iii) promoting  substantive justice by protecting a morally and politically
acceptable set of individual rights.
Third, theories should be judged by their likely fruits. To  determine
which theory would best promote ultimate goals, it is crucial to assess what
kinds of judicial decisions would likely be made if a particular theory were
adopted. If this conclusion is accepted,  the attraction of substantive theo-
ries becomes clear, but the allure of formal theories grows puzzling.  Why
have so many formal theories  achieved  prominence?  Is preference  for  a
formal over a substantive theory inherently misguided? In Part III, I argue
that the anticipated pattern of decisions  depends not only on a theory's ex-
plicit tenets, but also on who our judges and Justices are likely to be,  and
what values  and perspectives  they will bring to their decision making. A
constitutional theory should be chosen with this consideration in mind.
Fourth, as is argued in Part IV, questions  of constitutional theory are
not optional;  they cannot be put off as merely academic pre-occupations,
which have no necessary  role in the work of judges  and lawyers. Every
constitutional argument reflects methodological assumptions. A judge who
relies on identifiable assumptions in one case is properly subject to criti-
cism if her arguments  in another case  reflect  different,  inconsistent  as-
sumptions.
Of these four claims, I expect the third to engender the greatest con-
troversy. To  some, the suggestion that a constitutional  theory should be
selected based on its likely results may seem to invite unprincipled, result-
oriented decision making that is inconsistent with obligations of constitu-
tional fidelity and the rule of law. In Parts IV and V, however, I reject this
conclusion.  It would be naive  and misguided to choose  a constitutional
theory without regard to whether it would be likely, on balance, to yield
"good" results. Nonetheless, a theory, once chosen, ought to bind any prin-
cipled  adherent to at least some results  that she would  otherwise reject.
Against the background of these broader claims, Part V briefly explores the
questions of who should choose a constitutional theory-individual judges
and citizens, or the people collectively-and  of the time horizon for which
a theory should be adopted.
1999]CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
I
THE INHERENTLY VALUE-LADEN  CHOICE BETWEEN
TEXT-BASED  AND PRACTICE-BASED  THEORIES
The daunting array of constitutional  theories presents  an immediate
question:  which theory is best? Yet this question may itself raise the sec-
ond-order  question:  by what criteria should constitutional  theories be as-
sessed?
Many,  if not  most,  constitutional  theorists  acknowledge  that  the
choice among constitutional  theories must be made partly on grounds ex-
ternal  to the written Constitution.8 But proponents  of text-based  theories
sometimes suggest that their theories  are justified by their uniquely excel-
lent fit with the written Constitution and that normative argument is there-
fore unnecessary.9 This position is untenable. The choice of a constitutional
theory  requires  appeal  to normative  criteria,  which  must themselves  be
specified and defended.
A.  The Nature of Constitutional  Theories
Like legal theories generally,  constitutional theories resist classifica-
tion  according to the division between positive or descriptive theories  on
the one hand and normative  or prescriptive theories on the other. 1 0 Few, if
any, constitutional theories are purely normative."  Most, if not all, claim to
fit or explain  what they characterize  as the most fundamental  features  of
the  constitutional  order. 2  But  few  constitutional  theories  are  purely
8.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's  Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 564
(1997)  (reviewing  SCALIA,  supra note  7)  (asserting  that  "any  approach  to  interpretation  must  be
defended  partly by reference to its  consequences");  Laurence  H. Tribe,  Comment, in SCALIA,  supra
note 7, at 65, 76-77  ("In choosing among ...  views of what counts as  'the Constitution,'  and as binding
constitutional  law, one must of necessity look outside the Constitution itself.").
9.  See supra  note 2 and accompanying  text.
10.  See  Richard  H.  Fallon,  Jr.,  A  Constructivist Coherence Theory  of Constitutional
Interpretation,  100 HARv.  L. REv.  1189,  1231  (1987).  Professor Dworkin, whose account  I generally
follow  on  this point,  has  suggested  that  legal theories  should  be classified  as  "interpretive."  See
DWORKIN,  LAW's  EMPIRE, supra note  1, at 45-113.  According  to Dworkin, legal theorists  typically
begin  with a tentative or "pre-interpretive"  understanding  of the materials  that a  good legal  theory
ought to fit, and  then craft a theory  that, in addition  to satisfying a requirement of fit, portrays the
relevant  body of law in the best moral light. See id. at 65-68.  In the effort to develop a  theory that
shows  legal practice  as  reflecting a body  of norms  that are morally deserving of extension  into  the
future,  some  norms  or decisions  that  were provisionally  accepted  ultimately  may  be rejected  as
mistakes or aberrations that cannot be adequately explained within a theory or body of law that is both
morally attractive  and internally  self-consistent. See RONALD  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY
118-23  (1977)  [hereinafter  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY]  (discussing  the  need  for a  legal
theory to include a "theory of mistakes").
11.  Indeed,  the response  to  a "purely  normative"  theory-for example,  a  theory  that judges
should always do whatever will have the greatest tendency to maximize utility, regardless of whether
the constitutional provisions being interpreted can fairly be understood as reflecting this aim-might be
that this is not a "constitutional theory" at all, but rather is a moral or political theory.
12.  See Fallon, supra  note  10, at 1233.
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descriptive either. 3 Most theorists also seek to influence practice, typically
by offering prescriptions  for reform. 4  These prescriptions  aim to bring
constitutional practice more fully into accord with what the various theo-
ries identify as the deepest fundamental values of the written Constitution
or of surrounding practices. 5
In light of the nature of constitutional theories,  an immediate question
is what a good constitutional theory ought to fit or describe. Interestingly,
constitutional  theorists disagree about this question. Although the lines  of
division are  complex,  a rough but useful  distinction exists between text-
based and practice-based  approaches.
1 6
1.  Text-Based Theories
Theories that are predominantly  text-based rest their claim to accep-
tance on their fit with, or their capacity to explain, the written Constitution.
A clear example is originalism, which calls for the Constitution to be inter-
preted in accordance  with the "original understanding"  of those who wrote
and ratified relevant language and the generation to which the Constitution
was originally addressed. 1 7 Prominent originalists maintain that we can in-
fer the appropriateness of interpretation in accord with the original under-
standing  from  the  Constitution  itself. According  to  originalists,  the
Constitution plainly sets out to establish law that binds courts as well as
other governmental  officials.'  In the view of originalists, law requires both
13.  See id.  At least one commentator has read the constitutional theory  advanced by BOBBITT,
supra note 1, as taking an entirely "descriptive approach to constitutional jurisprudence"  by offering an
account of six  "modalities"  of constitutional argument,  none of which Bobbitt portrays as  requiring
"justification," and  which,  according to Bobbitt, are capable of rendering  constitutional arguments
"legitimate" or "true." DENNIS PATTERsON,  LAW  AND  TRUTH 142 (1996). But if Bobbitt's theory were
wholly "descriptive"  in this way, it would offer no answer to the question, which can intelligibly arise
within constitutional  argument, why any decision reached within the modalities, even in cases of modal
conflict, should be regarded as justifying the exercise or non-exercise of coercive power by the state.
Cf.  id.  at 169-79 (acknowledging that modal choice invites demands for justification).
14.  See Posner, supra note 1, at  10 ("Constitutional  theorists  want to  influence  constitutional
practice.").
15.  See Fallon, supra  note 10, at 1233-37.
16.  For further  explanation  and  qualification  of this  distinction, see  infra notes  17-44  and
accompanying  text. In introducing the distinction between  text-based and practice-based theories, I do
not mean to imply that this is necessarily the most fundamental line of division among constitutional
theories, or that the theories on either side of the line all share a common purpose or motivation.  My
principal aim  is  simply to  establish that anyone  who is  interested  in constitutional  law confronts
threshold questions  about what a good constitutional  theory ought to fit, and why.
17.  See, e.g., BoRK,  supra  note 1, at 144-55; SCALIA,  supra  note 7, at 38-47.
Although  originalism  is a clear example of a text-based theory,  not all text-based  theories  are
originalist. For example,  some theorists  believe that constitutional interpretation  should reflect the
contemporary meaning,  rather than the originally understood meaning,  of some or all constitutional
language. See, e.g., Tribe, supra  note 8, at 65, 66-68. See generally  Paul Brest, The Misconceived  Quest
for the Original Understanding,  60 B.U. L. Rav. 204, 209-17  (1980)  (differentiating  textualist from
original intentionalist approaches to constitutional interpretation).
18.  See, e.g., BoRic, supra  note 1, at 1-5; ScALIA,  supra  note 7, at 40-41.CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
public notice and fixity of meaning.19 And the only possible source  of his-
torically fixed public meaning  is the original understanding-that  is, what
the Constitution  meant  to the generation  to which  it was  originally  ad-
dressed by those who wrote and ratified it.2"
Although  different  from  originalism in  some  respects,  John  Ely's
"representation  reinforcement" theory is similarly text-focused.2  Accord-
ing to Ely, some provisions of the Constitution could be read in isolation as
directing judges to identify rights by referring  to values not enumerated  in
the text itself?  Ely also believes that the original understanding  of some
provisions would license judges to recognize rights not specified within the
Constitution's four comersO  Nonetheless,  Ely argues  that the theory that
best fits the Constitution as a whole requires judges to interpret otherwise
"open-ended '24  guarantees  consistently  with the predominant,  textually-
expressed values of procedural fairness and, especially, representative  de-
mocracy.
2.  Practice-Based  Theories
In contrast with text-based approaches,  other constitutional theories
are predominantly  practice-based. For practice-based theories, the founda-
tion of the constitutional order inheres in the facts of social practice. 26 Pro-
ceeding from this assumption, practice-based  theorists look to see what is
treated in practice as the Constitution or as possessing the status of consti-
tutional law.
Examples  of practice-based  approaches  appear in the  otherwise  di-
verse  writings  of  Ronald  Dworkin, 27  Bruce  Ackerman, 28  and  David
19.  See  BORK, supra note 1,  at 143-44; see also SCALIA,  supra note 7, at 40 (asserting that the
"whole purpose" of the Constitution "is to prevent change").
20.  See  BoRKx,  supra note 1, at 5  (stating that for  a judge to be "bound  by law"  means  to be
"bound by the only thing that can be called law, the principles of the text..,  as generally understood at
the enactment").
21.  See ELY, supra note 1, at 87-101.
22.  See id.  at 11-32.
23.  See id.  at 28-30 (Privileges or Immunities Clause); id. at 38  (Ninth Amendment).
24.  Id.  at 14.
25.  See id.  at 73-104,  116-79.
26.  See generally Frederick  Schauer,  Amending  the Presuppositions of a  Constitution,  in
RESPONDING  TO IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY AND  PRACTICE  OF CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT  145
(Sanford Levinson  ed.,  1995)  (noting  that constitutional debates  characteristically presuppose  basic
patterns  of social  practice,  including  practices  of accepting  certain  texts  and  institutions  as
authoritative).
27.  See,  e.g.,  DWORKIN,  FREDOM'S  LAW, supra note  1;  DWORKIN,  LAw's  EMPIRE, supra
note 1.
28.  See,  e.g.,  1 ACKERMAN,  supra note  1;  2  ACKERMAN,  supra note  I;  Bruce  Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional  Law, 99 YALE  L.J.  453  (1989)  [hereinafter  Ackerman,
Constitutional  Politics]; Bruce Ackerman,  The  Storrs Lectures:  Discovering the Constitution, 93
YALE  L.J.  1013 (1984)  [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures].
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Strauss.29 In a striking analogy, Dworkin compares constitutional adjudica-
tion with the authorship  of a "chain  novel." 3  The Framers  and ratifiers
wrote the first chapter, but Dworkin claims that widely accepted norms of
legal practice obligate contemporary  adjudicators to weave a narrative that
fits or explains judicial precedent,  as well  as the constitutional text and its
original history.3' Dworkin further maintains that norms of practice call for
judges  to depict authoritative legal materials in the best moral light, what-
ever that might be.32  According  to Dworkin, a good constitutional theory
must not only fit, but must also rationalize or justify, the central features of
constitutional practice.33
Bruce  Ackerman  also  takes  constitutional  practice  as  his  starting
pointM He emphasizes that the norms reflected in contemporary  adjudica-
tion frequently cannot be traced to the written Constitution alone.3 5 To un-
derstand  existing  practice,  he  argues,  we  must  acknowledge  that the
Constitution has been informally revised by unwritten amendments, which
have achieved legitimacy  through informal ratification by the People. 36 In
perhaps his most arresting example, Ackerman argues that the Constitution
was informally  amended by the People during the New Deal era to reject
limits on governmental power previously enforced by the Supreme Court. 37
As  a  result of  this  amendment,  he  maintains,  the  Constitution  today
licenses vast federal power under the Commerce Clause,  and it no longer
29.  See Strauss, supra  note 1.
30.  See DwoRIuN, LAw's EMPIRE, supra  note 1, at 228-32; see also DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S LAw,
supra note  1, at 10 (asserting that judges "must regard themselves as partners with other officials, past
and  future, who together elaborate  a coherent constitutional morality, and they must take care to see
that what they contribute fits with the rest").
31.  See DwoRuN,  FREEDoM's LAw, supra  note 1, at 10;  DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPmE, supra  note 1,
at 254-59, 397-99.
32.  See, e.g.,  DwoRKrN, FREEDOM's  LAw, supra  note 1, at 2-4; DwoRKIN,  LAw's EMPIRE,  supra
note 1, at 355-89, 397-99.
33.  See DwoRKIN, LAW'S Ea'RE, supra  note 1, at vii, 355-89, 397-99.
34.  See 1 ACIERMAN,  supra  note 1, at 22 (observing that "the Constitution is best understood as
a historically rooted tradition of theory and practice").
35.  See 2 ACKERMAN supra  note 1, at 8-3 1; Ackerman, Storrs Lectures,  supra note 28, at 1070-
72.
36.  1 ACEItAN, supra  note 1, at 44-50, 81-130;  Ackerman, Constitutional  Politics,  supra note
28, at 499-516;  Ackerman, Storrs Lectures,  supra note  28, at 1057-70; cf 2 AcKERMAN, supra note  1,
at 270 (characterizing  the new constitutional understandings that resulted  from the Supreme Court's
"switch  in time" that resulted  in  validation  of New  Deal  regulatory legislation  as  "amendment-
analogues").
Although Ackerman  differs with originalists about the content of "the  Constitution" that judges
should  enforce,  his theory is otherwise  analogous  to originalism:  he too believes that the proper
judicial function is to identify, synthesize, and implement norms ratified by "the People" on identifiable
historical  occasions. See 1 AcmKRMAN,  supra note 1, at 89,  140-42;  cf.  Michelman, supra note  1, at
1522 (noting the similarity between Ackerman's views and those of Robert Bork).
37.  See 1 ACKEPNLAN,  supra note 1, at 47-50, 101-30; 2 ACKERMAN,  supra note 1,  at 279-382;
Ackerman,  Constitutional  Politics,supra  note 28,  at 513-15; Ackerman,  Storrs Lectures, supra note
28, at 1057-70.
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includes the same protections  of property and other economic rights that it
previously did. 8
As  a  final  example,  David  Strauss  launches  his  arguments  for  a
"common  law"  approach  to constitutional  interpretation  by  noting that
judges more frequently decide cases by reasoning from precedent than they
do by appealing to the constitutional text. 9 According to Strauss, constitu-
tional law has developed-and  should continue to develop-on the model
of the common law, which permits desirable adaptation in light of evolving
needs and values.4
3.  Blurring  the Distinction
Although clear cases  of text-based  and practiced-based  theories  are
easily distinguishable, I do not mean to claim that all theories fall on one or
the other side of a categorical divide.  Text-based theorists cannot divorce
themselves  entirely  from considerations  of practice,  and practice-based
theorists recognize the importance of the written Constitution.
Text-based theories must acknowledge  the significance of several  so-
cial practices.  For the constitutional text to be intelligible at all, it must be
situated within  a linguistic practice;  and for the Constitution  to be law, it
must exist within political  and legal practices  that accord  it that status  .4a
Nonetheless, in identifying the Constitution's "meaning,"  text-based theo-
rists try to abstract as far away as possible from existing, specialized inter-
pretive practices  among lawyers and judges. Instead, such theorists appeal
to intuitions about how the constitutional text would be understood among
a  community  of  contemporary  English-speakers  who  knew  the
Constitution's  general  purposes  (as  revealed  by  historical  studies)  and
originally  understood meaning, but had not been initiated into specialized
practices of constitutional interpretation.42
Similarly, even the most paradigmatically  practice-based theory must
acknowledge that American constitutional practice has a text at its center. 4
The  question  is  never whether practice  dictates  a result  other than  that
called for by the constitutional text; rather, the question is always how  the
38.  See I AcKEi mAN, supra  note  1, at 102-03; 2  ACKERMAN,  supra  note  1, at 333-82; Ackerman,
Storrs  Lectures, supra  note 28, at 1071.
39.  See Strauss, supra  note 1, at 883.
40.  See id. at 885 ("[O]ur written constitution has ...  become part of an evolutionary common
law system,  and the common law..,  provides  the best way to understand  the practices of American
constitutional law."); id. at 888. For an earlier theoretical effort to assimilate constitutional  adjudication
to common law adjudication, see Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional  Double
Standards:  Some Notes on Adjudication,  83 YALE LJ. 221 (1973).
41.  See Schauer, supra  note 26, at 150-57.
42.  See SCALIA,  supra  note 7, at 37-41.
43.  See, e.g.,  DwoRKIN,  FIEDOM's LAW,  supra note  1, at 76-81  (arguing  that all recognized
rights trace to interpretation  of the written  Constitution); Strauss, supra  note  1, at 906-11  (noting  the
authority accorded to the constitutional  text).
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Constitution should be interpreted or applied in light of precedent or moral
or prudential considerations, as well as certain norms of practice.'
In view of these complexities, the notions of text-based and practice-
based approaches may not define polar opposites so much as regions along
a continuum.  Nonetheless, in addition to marking an important difference
of emphasis among constitutional theories, the distinction calls attention to
a striking feature of contemporary debates:  at least on the surface, there is
disagreement concerning  the appropriate  subject matter of constitutional
theory. Although everyone agrees that a good theory must fit or explain the
central  features  of our constitutional  order, there  is disagreement  about
what, exactly, the most relevant features are.
B.  The Limits of Positivism
Choosing between a text-based and a practice-based approach to con-
stitutional theory requires  a judgment of normative preferability. Any ef-
fort to justify a text-based  approach by appeal to the written Constitution
would be circular:  the Constitution  cannot prove  the validity of a  text-
based  approach  when precisely  what is  at issue  is whether the  written
Constitution  is  the sole  source  of legitimate  authority  in  constitutional
law.45 Nor, as discussed below, could practice-based theorists persuasively
appeal to accepted facts of practice to justify their approach. In the face of
divergent claims  about what a good constitutional  theory most centrally
ought to fit, an important and possibly decisive consideration is whether a
text-based  or  a practice-based  approach  would produce  better  constitu-
tional law (as measured by appropriate standards).
Defenders  of  text-based  approaches-especially  originalists-
sometimes resist this argument. The necessary correctness  of a text-based
theory, they sometimes  suggest, does not depend on a philosophical argu-
ment about what the law ought to be, but on an almost self-evidently valid
legal argument  about what the law is:  everyone  knows  that the written
Constitution is the supreme law of the United States, binding on courts  as
well as other officials. 46 And if the written Constitution is the supreme law,
a theory about what the supreme law is-which is to say, a constitutional
theory-must necessarily fit the written Constitution. There is no need, the
argument continues,  to get into  the question of whether it is desirable for
the written Constitution to be treated as the supreme authority; it is enough
44.  See DWORIUN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW, supra note 1, at 76-81  (denying that there is a meaningful
distinction between "enumerated" and "unenumerated"  constitutional rights, since all recognized rights
emerge from interpretation of the Constitution).
45.  See Henry  Paul Monaghan,  Stare Decisis and Constitutional  Adjudication, 88  COLUM.  L.
REv. 723, 771 (1988); Tribe, supra note 8, at 76.
46.  See Borne, supra  note 1, at 173-74; Henry P. Monaghan,  Our  Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.
L. RaV. 353,383-84 (1981).
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to establish  that the Constitution,  rather than  possibly  competing  norms
derived from legal "practice,"  is the ultimate law.47
However  plausible it may  appear on the surface, this argument begs
the central questions in issue. One set of questions,  emphasized by Bruce
Ackerman's practice-based theory,48 involves what "the Constitution" is. Is
the  Constitution  only  the  written  document  preserved  in the  National
Archives,  or does it include unwritten amendments?49 Is entrenched prece-
dent now part of the Constitution in some meaningful sense?50 Are widely
shared and enduring values and assumptions-what the Supreme Court has
referred  to  as  the  "postulates"  that lie behind  constitutional  terms  and
"limit and control" their application5-themselves  of constitutional status?
Another  set of questions involves how to interpret "the Constitution."  To
acknowledge that the Constitution is the supreme law is not necessarily to
accept that the best theory  of constitutional  interpretation  will  be based
solely on the Constitution's text, heedless both of the way that courts have
interpreted the Constitution over time and of the considerations  that have
given rise to a complex interpretive  practice. To determine what needs to
be interpreted is one thing; to identify  applicable  norms  of interpretation
may be another.
In maintaining that the written Constitution simply is the ultimate law
and that any methodology of constitutional interpretation must therefore fit
or  derive  from  it  alone-with  no  need  for  normative  argument52--
originalists attempt to cast themselves as legal "positivists" who insist on a
separation between  legal argument  and moral  argument? 3 They  assume
that because the Constitution owes its status as ultimate law to its origins in
the  commands  of a  sovereign  lawgiver,  the People,' 4 no  other  norms,
47.  See  BoRc,  supra  note  1, at  173-74;  Monaghan,  supra  note  46,  at  383-84.  Professor
Monaghan  has subsequently  changed his mind. See  Monaghan, supra note 45, at 771 (noting that "the
relation between  text and judicial gloss cannot be taken  as obvious"  and that  the "reality"  is  that
"[j]udges and lawyers ...  are centrally concerned with judicial decisions, not with the text").
48.  See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
49.  Cf  Sanford Levinson, Accounting for Constitutional Change (Or, How Many Times Has the
United States Constitution Been Amended?  (A) <26; (B) 26; (C)  >26; (D) All of the Above),  8 CONST.
COMMENTARY  409  (1991)  (noting  the plausibility  of recognizing  unwritten  amendments);  Strauss,
supra note 1, at 884 (asserting "the prevalence and importance of nontextual amendments").
50.  See DwoRKi,  LAW'S  Eamn'nt,  supra note  1, at 398 (endorsing the view that "the American
Constitution consists in the best available interpretation of American constitutional text and practice as
a whole");  Thomas  C. Grey, Do  We  Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN.  L. REv.  703  (1975)
(arguing that precedent,  practice,  and  conventional  morality  effectively  constitute  an  unwritten
constitution).
51.  Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
52.  See, e.g.,  BoRK, supra note  1, at 173-74.
53.  See Strauss, supra note  1, at 886 (noting positivist pretensions of originalist theories).
54.  See  id. (noting that originalists  treat "the Framers  of the Constitution (or its ratifiers)"  as
functioning  in the role of "Austin's sovereign"  under  a "command  model"  of the nature of law); cf
Lessig, supra note 1, at 1254 (explicating constitutional interpretation in terms of obligations owed by
an agent to a principal).
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including interpretive  norms,  can attain the status  of ultimate law unless
they, too, trace to the same source of sovereign authority.
Although this chain  of reasoning  might draw support  from an  older
brand of legal positivism that equated law with the "command" of a sover-
eign  (such as  the Framers  or ratifiers),'  this  equation  is untenable.  As
modem positivists such as H.L.A. Hart have argued, the foundations of law
(including constitutional law) do not lie in sovereign commands, but rather
in social practices involving the acceptance  of authority.5 6 Though perhaps
obscured in stable legal systems,  the crucial role of acceptance  becomes
manifest  in  cases  of what  we  call  "revolution."'7  The  commands  of
Parliament did not cease to be law in the United States because Parliament
commanded that its decrees  should no longer be law here; British enact-
ments ceased to be law because they ceased to be accepted as such in the
former American colonies.
Seen against the background of this more enlightening framework, the
legal status of the Constitution does not depend on the "command"  of the
Framers or ratifiers that we, the people of today, act in accordance with the
Constitution's  dictates.  Nor are interpretive practices  necessarily  illegiti-
mate if they are not similarly traceable to the commands  of an identifiable
sovereign.  Rather, the status  of the Constitution  as law depends  on con-
temporary practices accepting it as such.58
If the Constitution's  status as ultimate law  depends  on practices  of
acceptance,  then the claim that the written Constitution is  the only  valid
source of constitutional norms loses all pretense of self-evident validity. 9
As originalists candidly admit, originalist principles cannot explain or jus-
tify  much  of  contemporary  constitutional  law.'  Important  lines  of
55.  The classic "positivist" text attempting to associate the concept of law to the commands of a
sovereign lawgiver is John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence  Determined,  in THE PROViNCE  OF
JURISPRUDENCE  DETERMINED  AND  THE USES  OF THE  STUDY  OF JURISPRUDENCE  1  (H.L.A. Hart ed.,
Noonday  1954).  See generally Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding  Positivism, 93  MICH.  L.  REv.
2054,  2064-65  (1995)  (identifying  the  "command  theory  of law"  as  a constitutive  principle  of
"classical"  legal positivism).  For the classic  critique of the  command theory  and an  effort  to re-
establish legal positivism on more tenable foundations, see H.L.A. HART,  THE  CONCEPT OF LAW 18-99
(1961).
56.  Hart  suggested that the relevant social practices could be captured in a "rule"  or rules "of
recognition."  See HART, supra  note 55, at 97-120, 245-47. This formulation  was probably misleading.
See Schauer, supra note 26, at 150 ("There is no reason to suppose that the ultimate source of law need
be anything that looks at all like a rule... or even a collection of rules, and it may be less distracting to
think of the ultimate source of recognition...  as a practice."). But Hart's deep point does not depend
on whether  relevant  social attitudes  and practices  can be described  in rule-like form.  Even if the
sovereign's commands are the law, they are not the law because the sovereign has commanded that the
sovereign's  commands  should be  law,  but  because  relevant  parts  of the population  accept  the
sovereign's commands as authoritative.
57.  See HART, supra note 55, at 114-16 (discussing revolutions).
58.  See Schauer, supra note 26, at 50-57.
59.  See Monaghan, supra  note 45, at 771.
60.  See, e.g.,  BERGER, supra note 1, at 69-282; BoRyc, supra  note 1, at 19-128.
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precedent diverge from original understandings.6'  Judges frequently  take
other considerations into account. 62 Moreover, the public generally accepts
the courts'  non-originalist pronouncements  as legitimate 63-not  merely  as
final, but as properly rendered.'
In urging that existing judicial practices  should be altered, originalists
are not pure positivists, who insist that the "rule of recognition"  prevailing
in the United States reflects originalist principles.65 Rather, originalists, like
all other participants in constitutional theoretical  debates, carry a burden of
normative justification. They must attempt to establish that the constitu-
tional regime would be a better one-as measured by relevant criteria-if
constitutional practice  were  exclusively  text-based and if originalist pre-
cepts were consistently  followed.  Indeed, as  I shall  argue  below, many
originalists  implicitly  acknowledge  as  much:  like  proponents  of other
theories, originalists commonly appeal to values associated with the rule of
law, political democracy,  and individual rights in defending their interpre-
tive methodology.'
If text-based theorists must ultimately offer normative arguments for
reform,  it might appear  that  practice-based  theorists  could  assume  the
positivist mantle. They could then assert that their position fairly expresses
what the law simply is, 67 and claim that in light of the "lawfulness"  of their
61.  See, e.g.,  BORK, supra  note  1, at 19-128; Monaghan, supra  note 45, at 727-39.
62.  See DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW,  supra  note 1, at 3 ("Lawyers and judges, in their day-to-day
work,  instinctively treat  the Constitution as  expressing abstract  moral requirements  that can only be
applied  to concrete  cases  through  fresh  moral judgments  .... ");  SCALIA,  supra note  7,  at  38-49
(acknowledging  that in the dominant approach to constitutional interpretation, judges take into account
considerations other than the original understanding); Monaghan, supra  note 45, at 771-72.
63.  See CHARLES  L. BLACK,  JR.,  THE  PEOPLE  AND  THE  COURT  209 (1960)  (arguing  that the
continued acceptance  of judicial review  as practiced by the courts could not have occurred  in the  face
of perceived  illegitimacy).
64.  Cf HART, supra note 55, at 141-42 (distinguishing between the finality and the correctness of
decisions by an ultimate tribunal).
65.  John Ely  similarly acknowledges that much of our constitutional practice-which is to say
much of the constitutional law of the United States (in  the rule-of-recognition sense)-flatly rejects the
strictures  on  constitutional  interpretation  that he  endorses.  See  John  Hart  Ely,  Another Such
Victory:  Constitutional Theory and Practice in a  World Where  Courts Are No Different from
Legislatures, 77  VA.  L. REV.  833  (1991).  He,  too,  presses  a call for reform  that  is  based  on  an
interpretation of the constitutional  text, and not on a social-fact-based  account of what the positive law
is.
66.  See infra  notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
67.  Cf 2 ACKERMAN,  supra  note 1, at 92 (characterizing his theory as a species  of "humanistic
positivism").  Any  effort to classify text-based  and practice-based  theorists  as  positivists  and non-
positivists abounds with surface ironies. If "positivism"  equates  law with what is accepted as law as a
matter of social fact, see supra  notes  55-56 and accompanying  text, practice-based theorists look more
like positivists  than do  originalists, whose positions some  deride as positivist, or even "authoritarian."
See,  e.g.,  Michelman,  supra note  1,  at  1522;  Robin  L.  West,  The Authoritarian Impulse in
Constitutional  Law,  42 U. MIAMI L. REv.  531, 534-35  (1988)  (associating efforts  to find answers  to
constitutional  questions in historical  material with "the 'authoritarian  tradition"'). Yet because practice-
based  theorists  often call  for judges to  make  important and  contestable  moral  decisions,  they are
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approach, they need offer no further normative justification. But this route
is not  open to practice-based  theorists.  Norms of practice  foreclose  it.
Amid widespread methodological contention,68 it is the conventionally  ac-
cepted function of constitutional  theory not merely  to prescribe  an  ap-
proach, but to justify it by reference to shared norms or values.69
In short, neither text-based nor practice-based theorists can stand out-
side of morally charged debates about the comparative desirability of com-
peting constitutional theories.  One must choose a constitutional theory  at
least partly on extra-textual grounds. Indeed,  among the central challenges
in choosing  a constitutional theory  is to determine which text or texts to
work with-that is, whether  to prefer a text-based or a practice-based  ap-
proach.
II
THREE SHARED EVALUATIVE CRITERIA
In defending  their  preferred methodological  approaches,  constitu-
tional theorists necessarily  appeal to evaluative  criteria.  As  I have sug-
gested  already,  it appears  to be agreed  all around-indeed,  accepted  as
nearly definitional of the enterprise of constitutional theorizing-that one
important criterion is "fit." A good constitutional theory must fit either the
written  Constitution  or surrounding  practice. In the  absence of a fit re-
quirement, constitutional theory would lose its anchor in law and collapse
into  political theory.  As  discussed in Part  I, however,  arguments  about
whether constitutional theories satisfy  the fit criterion  often appear not to
engage  one another,  due to disagreement  about whether it is  the written
Constitution or constitutional practice that a theory most importantly ought
to reflect.
It does not follow, however, that there are no widely  accepted  stan-
dards by which different kinds of constitutional  theories can be tested and
compared. In adopting either a text-based  or a practice-based approach,
and then in embracing more specific methodological prescriptions,  consti-
tutional theorists typically appeal to three shared criteria. Almost without
exception, theorists claim that their preferred approaches  optimally realize
sometimes competing  values associated with (i) upholding the rule of law,
and morals. See, e.g., BoRK, supra  note  1, at 1-5, 251-53. Much of the confusion, and the surface irony,
undoubtedly results from a failure to  distinguish a number of analytically  variant positions that  are
sometimes grouped together under the "positivist" label. For some  valuable clarifications,  see Jules L.
Coleman, Negative and Positive  Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD.  139 (1982).
68.  See, e.g.,  DwoRlKN,  LAw's  EmPIRE, supra note  1, at  13  (characterizing  legal practice as
"argumentative");  Fallon,  supra note  10,  at  1234-37  (discussing  disagreement  about  "rules"  of
constitutional practice and their proper application).
69.  See David A. Strauss, What Is Constitutional  Theory?, 87 CALiF. L. RFv. 581, 582 (1999).
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(ii) promoting political democracy,  and (iii) advancing  substantive justice
by respecting a morally defensible set of individual rights.70
As is evident on the surface,  these criteria are  extremely vague. Al-
though nearly everyone  agrees  that the rule of law,  democracy,  and  indi-
vidual rights are  important values,  there  is rampant  disagreement  about
how these concepts are best understood. For example, some people believe
that the rule of law requires clear rules;7'  others endorse a conception of the
rule of law that is entirely consistent with common-law  decision making.7 2
There are similar disagreements  about what democracy  is  or requires-
whether, for example,  democracy entails that popular majorities should be
able to achieve any result that they wish, or whether a position is properly
"democratic"  only if it reflects  respect for the equal worth of every  citi-
zen.73 It is also notorious that different conceptions of justice generate dif-
ferent views of the rights, if any, that people have. 74
In saying that competing  constitutional  theorists  appeal to common
values, I therefore  do not mean to suggest that they agree about how those
values are best understood. Because deep agreement is lacking, neither do I
mean to suggest that disputes about constitutional theory should be easily
resolvable once the terms of debate are clarified. My aim, in a sentence, is
to illuminate  debates  about constitutional  theory,  rather  than  to resolve
them. Somewhat more precisely, I hope to explicate  for the possibly puz-
zled observer how it is that proponents  of text-based  and practice-based
constitutional  theories  (and  other seemingly  divergent  kinds of constitu-
tional theories,  such as methodological  and substantive  theories)  are  not
simply talking past each  other. Proponents  of constitutional  theories  are
70.  In one sense, fit is, of course, a fourth shared criterion.  As explained in the text, however, the
fit requirement stands on  a slightly different plane from the other three evaluative criteria  because the
other criteria can be and often are invoked to assess what exactly it is that a constitutional  theory ought
to fit.
71.  See, e.g., FRIEDRICH  A.  HAYEK,  THE POLITICAL  IDEAL OF THE  RULE  OF LAW  32-45 (1955);
FRIEDRICH  A. HAYEK,  THE  ROAD  TO SERFDOM  72-87  (1944);  Antonin Scalia,  The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REv.  1175 (1989).
72.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,  "The Rule of  Law" as a Concept in Constitutional  Discourse,  97
COLUM. L. RaV.  1, 18-21  (1997)  (discussing the work of authors who implicitly or explicitly  assume a
"legal process" ideal type of the rule of law).
73.  See DwoRuuN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra  note  I, at 15-26.
74.  Among modem  works,  the most celebrated theory  is undoubtedly  that of John Rawls. See
JOHN RAwLs,  A THEORY  OF JUSTICE  (1971).  Rawls's theory provides  that "each  person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive basic liberty  compatible with a similar liberty for others,"  and further
provides that social and economic inequalities  are permissible only insofar as they are "(a)  reasonably
expected to be to everyone's advantage,  and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all."  Id. at 60.
Among Rawls's  most prominent critics, Robert Nozick  argues  in favor of a much more  libertarian
approach, which recognizes a quite different set of rights, largely designed to protect individual citizens
and the fruits  of private initiative  from governmental  regulation.  See ROBERT  NOZICK,  ANARCHY,
STATE,  AND  UTOPIA at ix (1974). Michael Sandel broadly challenges the notion that public policy and
private morality  should be  organized  by liberal  conceptions,  including  the concept  of "rights"  as
defined by both Rawls  and Nozick. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL,  LIBERALISM  AND  THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
(1982).
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participants  in a single intelligible  debate,  even if the debate is deep  and
multi-faceted.
By  showing how  disagreements in constitutional  theory  are specifi-
cally bound up with diverging positions about the rule of law, democracy,
and individual rights, I also hope to provide  a framework within which
readers  can  determine  how various constitutional  theories  should be as-
sessed in light of their own views about the rule of law, political  democ-
racy,  and the individual rights  necessary  for substantive justice. But I do
not attempt in this Article to advance  substantive arguments  about the best
understanding of the rule of law, political democracy,  or individual rights,
nor do I advance a constitutional theory of my own.
I  also  should clarify  that,  in identifying  three  commonly  accepted
evaluative criteria for constitutional theories, I do not mean to offer tran-
scendent or foundational  arguments.  Questions about appropriate  evalua-
tive criteria for constitutional  theories  arise  within the same debates  in
which those criteria are invoked?5 In principle, such questions are therefore
as  contestable as  any others. In the face of possible contest,  my central
claim is empirically grounded:  within contemporary  debates, the ultimate
disagreement is not about whether constitutional theories should be tested
by three basic criteria, but about how these criteria-when identified at a
sufficiently high  level  of generality-are  best interpreted,  applied,  and
weighed against each other.
Although I advance  a broad claim that debates  about constitutional
theory typically assume the applicability of three specific  criteria, my ef-
forts  at documentation  are  necessarily  limited. I shall try  to suggest the
plausibility of my assertion, however, by arguing that selected well-known
theorists at least implicitly invoke the three criteria listed above in defend-
ing their theories. Among text-based theorists, I take my illustrations from
the writings  of the originalists  Robert  Bork and Antonin Scalia  and the
"representation-reinforcement"  theorist John Ely. For representatives of the
practice-based  approach,  I  discuss  the  theories  advanced  by  Ronald
Dworkin, Bruce Ackerman, and David Strauss.
A.  Text-Based Theories
In defending their theories against rivals, text-based theorists typically
rely perhaps most heavily on an ideal of the rule of law. Both Judge Bork
and Justice Scalia, for example, maintain that only an originalist methodol-
ogy can ensure the fixity of legal meaning, the predictability of results, and
75.  See  Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional  Interpretation,  30REPRESENTATIONS  13,  27
(1990) (denying that there could be forms or sources of constitutional authority external to the practice
of constitutional interpretation).
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the constraint on judges that the rule of law (in their view) requires. 76 Each
suggests  that it is  incompatible  with the rule of law for judges to  decide
cases based on their own moral views-as each contends  that judges will
inevitably do unless they  are bound by historically understood meanings.7 7
Sophisticated originalists  such as Bork and Scalia do not, however,
rest solely on the rule of law. For one thing, the rule of law admits  com-
peting conceptions or interpretations,7  and realization of rule-of-law values
is not an all-or-nothing proposition.79 As proponents of more common-law-
like approaches  emphasize,  common  law  regimes  are  often held  up  as
paradigms  of the rule of law, at least outside the possibly peculiar context
of constitutional law.8 '
In response to such arguments, Bork and Scalia, like other proponents
of text-based  approaches,  appeal  to the  second evaluative  criterion,  in-
volving political democracy.  They argue that political majorities should be
able  to determine public policy without being frustrated  by judicial  deci-
sions that reflect the judges'  moral values!' Constitutional law differs from
the common law, the argument continues, because democratically  account-
able legislatures  cannot reject constitutional decisions in the same way that
they can reject common law judgments.8 2
Although the  argument  from  political  democracy  may  cut  against
certain constitutional theories, it fails to establish the unique correctness  of
originalism.  Among  other things,  originalist  theory itself prescribes  that
judges should invalidate  at least some legislation that is supported by po-
litical majorities-namely, legislation that is incompatible with the original
understanding. The question  thus arises:  in what sense  is democracy  ad-
vanced when decisions are ruled by the understandings of people who have
long since died? At the very least, shouldn't judges indulge every reason-
able presumption in favor of upholding statutes  that are supported  by con-
temporary majorities?83
76.  See BoRg, supra note  1, at 1-5,  143-46,  154-55;  Antonin Scalia,  Originalism: The Lesser
Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 854, 862-63  (1989).
77.  See BoRK, supra  note 1, at 1-5; Scalia, supra  note 76, at 863.
78.  See Fallon, supra  note 72, at 10-24  (sketching four competing conceptions  of the rule of law).
79.  See id at 7.
80.  See id at 51.
81.  See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996)  (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
Supreme Court majority for "inscribing"  current preferences into the Constitution and arguing that the
Constitution,  as originally understood,  embodied  "[tihe virtue of a  democratic system"  that "enables
the people, over  time, to be persuaded that what they took for granted  is not so, and  to change  their
laws accordingly");  Planned Parenthood  v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,  1001  (1992)  (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that value judgments  not made by  the Constitution "should be voted on,  not dictated"  by
courts); BoRg, supra  note 1, at 139-41,264, 351-52.
82.  See BoRu,  supra  note 1, at 6-7; SCALIA,  supra  note 7, at 38.
83.  See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin  and Scope of  the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REv.  129,  144 (1893)  (arguing for judicial invalidation  of federal  statutes only when
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In defending a non-deferential judicial role in implementing  original
constitutional understandings,  Judge Bork emphasizes  that the Constitution
strikes  a balance between the rights of the majority and the rights of mi-
norities.'4 This response could,  of course, be understood  descriptively;  it
simply asserts a fact about our Constitution. But Bork clearly expects the
argument to have moral resonance. As between the rights of majorities and
the rights  of minorities,  he seems  to  imply, the written Constitution-as
measured by historical understandings-reflects  at least a sound approxi-
mation of substantive justice.s By adhering to the historically  understood
meaning, we get a more than acceptable mix of democratic decision mak-
ing and protected substantive rights.
Justice Scalia appears to rely on a similar premise when he argues that
an originalist  methodology-which  promises  firm  legal  rules  to  steel
judges against the temptation to decide cases in line with prevailing senti-
ments-may be necessary to ensure the effective protection of substantive
rights.86 Why should we care about the enforcement of the Constitution to
thwart political majorities,  if not because the legal rights  created by the
Constitution are morally deserving of protection?
Justice Scalia further suggests that constitutional theory must satisfy
interests  in ensuring protection of a morally and politically acceptable set
of individual rights when he describes his own brand of originalism as ap-
propriately  "faint-hearted."'  A  defensible  originalism,  he  argues,  must
"come  to terms with  [the]  reality"  that judges would not and  apparently
should not sustain practices  that, although understood  as constitutionally
acceptable by the framing  and ratifying generation, would be broadly  con-
demned today as cruel and unusual. 8
Congress  has made  "a very  clear" mistake);  cf  id. at  154-55 (noting  that the "clear  mistake"  rule
should not apply in cases involving federal judicial review of state legislation).
84.  See BORK, supra  note 1, at 139-41.
85.  See id. at 353-55. According  to Bork, "[t]he attempt to define individual liberties by abstract
moral  philosophy,"  rather than by the original understanding,  "is  actually likely to make  [individual
liberties]  more vulnerable."  Id. at  353.  And Bork finds  this prospect  "terrifying,"  id.,  within the
framework  of a self-consciously Burkean  view of the liberties that ought, in the moral  sense, to be
protected:
What  Burke  said  of the  abstract  theorists  who  produced  the  calamities  of the  French
Revolution  might equally be said of those, judges and professors alike, who would remake
our constitution out of moral philosophy:  "This sort  of people are so taken up  with their
theories  about the rights of man that they have totally forgotten his nature." Those who made
and endorsed our Constitution  knew man's  nature, and it is to their ideas, rather than to the
temptations of utopia, that we must ask our judges adhere.
d  d at 355 (footnote omitted).
86.  See SCALIA, supra  note 7, at 41-47; Scalia, supra  note 76, at 855-56.
87.  Scalia, supra note 76, at 864; see also Robert Post, Justice  for Scalia, 45 N.Y. REv. BooKs
57, 60 (June 11,  1998)  (concluding  that this example reveals Scalia's recognition that constitutional
adjudication  must respond to the  "purpose" of expressing "principles  that  constitute the  national
ethos").
88.  Scalia, supra  note 76, at 861.
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John Ely's defense of his text-based "representation-reinforcement"
theory  depends  on substantially the same criteria-although,  as might be
expected, in a slightly different order of priority. The heart of his argument
appeals  to political democracy. 89 According  to Ely, any  acceptable theory
of judicial review must accord with democratic values. He therefore argues
that courts should interpret "the Constitution's open-ended provisions",  in
ways that support, rather than contravene, political democracy.9'  But Ely's
argument  also implicitly, if not explicitly, invokes the rule of law and ap-
peals to other substantive values. He commences  his defense of his theory
by  attacking  methodologies  that  ask judges  to  identify  "fundamental
values."'  Such theories,  he argues, call for inherently  subjective decision
making that is, he may be understood to imply, inconsistent with the rule
of law. I' Finally, although his express reliance on substantive values is not
extensive, I Ely acknowledges that the text of the Constitution-which he
argues  that his theory respects uniquely well-protects  a number of sub-
stantive values that, in his words, make it "worth fighting for." 95
B.  Practice-Based  Theories
In presenting and defending their approaches, practice-based theorists
characteristically  invoke the same criteria as text-based theorists:  the rule
of law, political democracy, and the promotion of a morally and politically
acceptable set of individual rights. Though the priority  accorded  to these
values varies from one theory to another, no one disputes that all three are
relevant.
Ronald Dworkin's  Law's Empire6 proceeds  largely  by defending  a
jurisprudential conception of law and, thus, of the rule of law.' 7 According
to Dworkin, the ideal of law demands principled justification for the exer-
cise of force by the state.9" In light of this ideal,  the rule of law requires
judges to reach decisions that not only are consistent in principle with past
legal authorities, but also characterize  the relevant authorities  in the best
moral light?9 Needless to say, Dworkin's conception  of the rule of law is
89.  See ELY, supra note 1, at 4-9, 73-104.
90.  Md  at 41.
91.  See iU. at 102-03.
92.  See id. at 43-72.
93.  See id. (criticizing  strands of reasoning that end up accepting judges'  imposition of their own
values in the guise of enforcing the Constitution).
94.  For the argument that Ely's purportedly process-based theory pervasively reflects substantive
judgments, see Paul Brest, The Substance of  Process,  42 OHIo  ST. L.  131 (1981).
95.  ELY, supra  note  1, at 100.
96.  DWORKIN, LAW's EmPInz,  supra  note 1.
97.  See id. at 93  (equating the characterization  of "law"  offered in the book with "the rule  of
law").
98.  See id.
99.  See DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW, supra  note  1, at 37; DWORIN, LAW'S EMPs',  supra note 1,
at 225 ("According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the
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contestable."t°  In stark  contrast  with  the view  endorsed by  originalists,
Dworkin's ideal requires judges to make open judgments  of "political mo-
rality"1 01 in determining how judicial precedent, as well the values reflected
in the language and structure  of the written Constitution, would "best" be
characterized."  Among the virtues of his view, Dworkin maintains, is that
it can plausibly  explain  the extent to which  American  legal practice  is
"argumentative,"'' 3 or rife with disagreement about what the Constitution
means, without therefore being lawless.
Dworkin  also presents  his theory  as framed  to promote  individual
rights  and as consonant with political  democracy.  His theory  authorizes
judges to define rights in morally correct terms, rather than (as originalists
would insist) being bound by the conceptions  that prevailed in past eras."
Dworkin further insists that constitutional rights, once defined, should not
yield easily  even to important policy interests.05  Having located the af-
firmative grounds  for preferring his theory largely in the rule of law and
substantive justice, Dworkin argues that his recommendations  accord with
the ideal of political democracy, rightly understood. "0
Bruce Ackerman's practice-based  theory carries its democratic  com-
mitment on the surface."°  By recognizing the possibility of informal con-
stitutional  amendments,  his  theory  defends  the prerogative  of  aroused
majorities  to revise the Constitution without  going through the cumber-
some procedures  specified in Article V. 01  Some have viewed the notion of
unwritten constitutional amendments as antithetical to the rule of law, be-
cause stability  and determinacy may be hard to achieve without a written
text.'19 Against this objection, Ackerman argues that his theory is necessary
principles  of justice,  fairness,  and  procedural  due  process  that  provide  the  best  constructive
interpretation of the community's legal practice."); id. at 254-58.
100.  See Fallon, supra note 72, at 7 (noting  that "the rule of law"  is  an "essentially  contested
concept").
101.  DwORmKN,  FREEDOM'S  LAw, supra  note 1, at 2,37.
102.  See id. at 11,  37; DwoR,  N, LAw's EmePnE, supra note 1, at 355-89, 397-99.
103.  DwoRKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 1, at 13.
104.  See DwoRKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW,  supra  note 1, at 2-4; DWORKIN, LAW'S  EmPnta, supra  note
1, at 364-65, 368-69.
105.  See, e.g.,  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIoUSLY,  supra note 10,  at xi  (defining rights  as
"trumps").
106.  See  DWORKIN,  FRnEDOM'S LAw, supra note  1, at 15-35  (distinguishing "majoritarian"
democracy  from  "constitutional"  democracy,  which insists that  all persons  be treated  with equal
concern  and respect,  and arguing  that his  theory  is  consistent  with "constitutional,"  though  not
"majoritarian,"  democracy).
107.  Frank  Michelman  has  described  Ackerman's  theory  as  the  "most  deeply
popularist...  constitutional  theory now going." Michelman, supra  note 1, at 1520.
108.  See 1 AcKERmAN, supra  note 1, at 266-94; 2 AcKERmA,  supra  note 1, at 28-3 1; Ackerman,
Storrs Lectures, supra  note 28, at 1057-70.
109.  See, e.g.,  BoRm  supra  note  1, at 215 (describing Ackerman's theory  as "an  invitation for
coup  by judiciary");  RicHARD A.  POSNER,  OVERCOMING  LAw  228  (1995)  (describing  Ackerman's
theory  as "[diangerous  because it invites judges to treat the popular will  as  a form of higher  law
entitling them to disregard  ordinary concepts of legality");  Charles Fried,  The Supreme Court, 1994
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to defeat the nihilistic claim, which is rendered plausible by the departure
of constitutional doctrine from original understandings of the constitutional
text, that judges  simply shape constitutional law to their own political val-
ues.11 0  Far from abandoning  the rule of law, his theory  may thus help to
explain  how the rule of law could survive in our constitutional  order, in
which judicial practice is impossible to explain persuasively by reference
to the written Constitution alone.'
Ackerman's  appeals  to substantive justice sound  two major themes.
First, he believes that the "informal"  amendments  that occurred  during the
New Deal marked  an important step toward substantive justice, both by
abolishing  many  of  the  economic  "rights"  recognized  through  the
Lochner"'  era and by licensing  a welfare  state." 3 Second, Ackerman  ac-
cepts that the path of further moral progress must lie through an appropri-
ately constrained  and structured  democratic  process,  such  as his theory
attempts to ensure."'  To be defensible, any political  scheme must be rea-
sonably  democratic.  Ackerman  believes  that  what  he  calls  "dualist
democracy""--in  which a politically aroused citizenry can establish con-
stitutional norms that subsequently bind political majorities-offers  better
prospects  for recognition and enforcement  of a defensible  set of individual
rights  than  would  a framework in  which  rights either could not be  en-
trenched  at all, or  could be entrenched  only  by the cumbersome  formal
process  outlined in Article V."6
The  final  practice-based  theory  to  which  I  have  referred,  David
Strauss's  "common  law"  theory  of constitutional  interpretation,  empha-
sizes the importance of substantive justice."7  According to Strauss, judges
serve  this  interest  best  by  proceeding  on  the  basis  of  a  critical
traditionalism;  they should assume that prior authorities represent distilled
Term-Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV.  L. REv.  13,  30-33 (1995)  (criticizing Ackerman's  theory
by arguing that for the Constitution to function as law, it requires "a core of textuality").
110.  See Ackerman, Storrs  Lectures, supra  note 28, at 1070-72.
111.  See 2 ACKERMAN,  supra note  1, at 30  (arguing that although  there are  not  clear "rules"
governing procedures  of informal constitutional amendment, controlling principles and precedents can
be identified, and that "there  is more to law than rules").
112.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
113.  See  Bruce  Ackerman,  Rooted Cosmopolitanism,  104  ETHIcS  516,  524  (1994)
(characterizing  "the New Deal  [as]  a crucial  constitutional breakthrough,"  though  as one that did not
"go nearly far enough");  see also Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of  Liberalism Past,  105  HARV.  L. Pv.
918,  933-34 (1992)  (reviewing 1 ACKERMAN,  supra note 1) (arguing that Ackerman's  constitutional
theory  aims to protect New Deal liberalism from conservative political attacks by endowing it with a
constitutional  foundation).
114.  See  1  ACKERMAN, supra note  1, at 318  (asserting that  "lasting progress"  toward  social
justice is more likely under his political and constitutional theory  of "dualist democracy"  than  under
rival theories);  2 ACKERMAN,  supra note  1, at 409 (embracing  an ideal  of "popular  sovereignty");
Ackerman, supra  note  113, at 535.
115.  See 1 ACKERMAN,  supra  note 1, at 6-7.
116.  Seeid at 318.
117.  See Strauss, supra  note  1, at 891-97.
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wisdom," 1  but retain the critical capacity to modify or even reject past ap-
proaches.1 9 Strauss defends his theory as consistent with the rule of law; he
argues  that "the  common law method has  a centuries-long  record of re-
straining judges."' ' 0  He  also addresses  arguments  that  common-law-like
constitutional decision making is anti-democratic.'  Among other things,
Strauss maintains that, given the age of the written Constitution, common-
law-like  decision  making may  permit judges  to  temper what  otherwise
would be anti-democratic rule by the norms of past generations."
C.  Continuing  Disagreement  and an Agenda  for Further  Analysis
In identifying implicit agreement about three criteria (besides  "fit")
against which constitutional  theories should be judged-involving  relative
capacities to promote the rule of law, democracy,  and the protection of in-
dividual rights-my argument has necessarily proceeded at a high level of
abstraction.  In order to choose a constitutional  theory in an informed and
deliberative manner, anyone would therefore have to proceed several steps
further than I have gone. The ideals of the rule of law, democracy, and in-
dividual rights need to be elaborated more fully; judgments also need to be
made  about how these three  desiderata  should be balanced  against each
other.
I shall  not, however,  attempt the further,  necessary  analysis  in this
Article. My aim, so far, has been to clarify the terms of contemporary  de-
bate about constitutional  theory. I would hope that partisans  on all  sides
might agree with my claims about tacit, underlying agreement on the crite-
ria  by which  competing  theories  should be judged.  By contrast,  further
analysis would swiftly require me to judge the merits of large, if not in-
tractable, disputes-for example, about what is the best understanding of
the rule  of law"n  and democracy,'  and about which  rights ought to  be
protected  as  a matter of substantive justice.  I must  leave this  daunting
challenge for another occasion. My goal in this Article is not to furnish a
fully  worked  out constitutional theory,  but  to identify  the  paths  down
which anyone who would evaluate constitutional theories must be prepared
to tread.
118.  See  i  at 891-94.
119.  See id  at 894-97.
120.  Id. at 927.
121.  See id.  at 925.
122.  See id.  at 928-34.
123.  For further arguments about how this concept would best be understood,  see Fallon, supra
note 72, at 42-55.
124.  For recent  discussions  of competing  conceptions  of democracy  and their  relevance  to
constitutional  adjudication,  see DWORKIN,  FREEDoM's LAW,  supra note  1, at  15-26,  and Frank  I.
Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CA~a.  L. REv. 399 (1998).
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D.  Assessing the Prevailing  Criteria
In light of my aspiration to clarify the bases  on which a constitutional
theory  should be  selected, I must,  however,  confront  one  further ques-
tion:  should anyone  choosing or assessing  a constitutional  theory accept
the evaluative criteria to which leading theorists currently appeal, or should
the prevailing  terms of debate be rejected or modified? In my judgment,
the current criteria  all deserve  acceptance  as centrally relevant to the  as-
sessment of constitutional theories.  It is  a harder question whether the fa-
miliar  criteria  should be treated  as exclusive.  In  my  view,  at  least one
further factor deserves  consideration,  though more in a secondary  or tie-
breaking than in a primary role. This is the relative likelihood that any par-
ticular theory might earn broad acceptance  as a reasonable framework for
judicial decision making.
1.  The Relevance of the Prevailing  Criteria
Diverse considerations,  representing a broad range  of plausibly valu-
able perspectives,  converge to support the testing of constitutional theories
against mixed,  weighted interests in the rule of law,  political democracy,
and individual rights. The rule of law is both an end in itself and an instru-
mental good that enables  the planning, trust, and productive enterprise  on
which  such constitutional  aspirations  as  "the general  Welfare"  and "the
Blessings of Liberty"'"  depend. 6  As  a more nearly  descriptive  matter,
both the constitutional text and constitutional practice invite characteriza-
tion in light of rule-of-law values. Marbury v. Madison  famously identi-
fied  the  Constitution  with  law,  and  rule-of-law  arguments  resound  in
contemporary  constitutional  discourse."  As  Lon Fuller  demonstrates,  a
workable legal order requires  adherence to rule-of-law values such as fair
notice, stability, and predictability. 1 2 9
As diverse theorists  have recognized,  political  democracy expresses
respect for the moral equality of persons. 30 Democracy is also a necessary
(but not a sufficient) condition  for realization  of the satisfactions that can
attend collective self-government.1 3'  Moreover, democracy remains proba-
bly the best device to ensure government that is reasonably  responsive to
125.  U.S. CONST. preamble.
126.  See generally Fallon, supra note 72, at 7-9 (cataloguing purposes and elements of the rule-
of-law ideal).
127.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137,  163 (1803).
128.  See Fallon, supra note 72, at 24-36.
129.  See, e.g.,  LON L. FULLER, THE  MORALITY  OF LAw  33-94  (rev. ed.  1964)  (employing  the
fable of King Rex to illustrate how failure to comply  with rule-of-law  values can result in inefficacy in
producing any law at all).
130.  See, e.g., DwoRirN, FREDOM's LAW, supra  note  1, at 15-35; Michelman, supra  note  1.
131.  Cf  Michelman, supra note I  (considering necessary  conditions for citizens to be both self-
governing and ruled by law).
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the will of the people.'32 Like the rule of law, the value of political democ-
racy is also firmly rooted both in the text of the written Constitution'33 and
in surrounding practices and traditions."M
Finally, guaranteeing individual rights is a central requirement of sub-
stantive justice, which should be the ultimate end-or, as Rawls  has said,
"the first virtue"-of all legal  systems.'35  Within the western legal  and
philosophical traditions, there tends to be less debate about whether  rights
should be protected than  about exactly  which rights  ought to be recog-
nized.'36 It goes virtually without saying that a commitment to respecting
individual rights is a hallmark of the American Constitution and surround-
ing legal practice.
2.  Other Criteria
In defending the status of the rule of law, democracy,  and an accept-
able set of individual rights as criteria against which constitutional theories
should be measured, I would not rule out the possibility that other evalua-
tive criteria might reasonably be invoked. Among other things,  affirming
the contrary view would require proof of a negative:  that no other consid-
eration is ever relevant. Although not tempted by this extravagant proposi-
tion,  I  would  defend  the  weaker  view  that  the  currently  prevailing
framework of debate requires no major reorientation at this time; the three
criteria commonly appealed to in current debates are sufficiently capacious
to subsume most, if not all, plausibly relevant values. Two examples  may
illustrate this claim. First, it is an obvious concern whether a particular the-
ory would permit a "workable"  government that can respond effectively to
changing needs and exigencies. 37 A second, closely related  consideration
is whether  a theory  would conduce  to wealth maximization  or economic
132.  See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY  AND ITS CRITICS 93-96 (1989).
133.  See, e.g., ELY, supra note 1, at 87-101.
134.  See id. at 5  ("We have  as  a society  from the beginning, and  now almost instinctively,
accepted the notion that a representative democracy must be our form of governmenL").
135.  RAwLs, supra note 74, at 3  ("Justice is the first virtue of social institutions.").
136.  Compare RAwLs, supra note 74, at 60-108  (defending a scheme of rights that is not violated
by and may indeed require the redistribution of wealth pursuant to egalitarian principles), with NozicK,
supra  note  74, at 149-231  (defending a scheme of rights against governmental redistribution as well as
against private interference with liberty and property).  There are, to be sure, critics of the rights-based
approaches  that dominate  contemporary legal and philosophical  debates. See,  e.g., Mark Tushnet, An
Essay on Rights, 62  TEx. L.  REv.  1363,  1363-64  (1984)  (arguing that  rights are  unstable  and
indeterminate, that they unduly reify experience, and that "[tihe use of rights in contemporary discourse
impedes advances by progressive social  forces"); see also Frances Olson, Statutory Rape: A Feminist
Critique of  Rights Analysis, 63  TEx. L. REv. 387, 412 (1984)  ("In  general, rights analysis  is merely
indeterminate; it contributes nothing to the resolution of concrete cases.").
137.  See Youngstown  Sheet &  Tube Co. v.  Sawyer,  343 U.S.  579, 635  (1952)  (Jackson,  J.,
concurring) (arguing that separation-of-powers  principles should be interpreted in light of this aim); A
WORKABLE  GOVERNMENT?  THE  CONSTITUTION  AFTER 200  YEARS  (Burke  Marshall  ed.,  1987)
(exploring whether the Constitution remains workable).
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efficiency.138 Although it is surely possible to imagine constitutional theory
debates  focused directly on these desiderata, the same concerns  can be ad-
dressed,  however imperfectly, under the rubrics  of fit and, especially, po-
litical democracy and respect for individual rights.
Concerns  of workability  and  economic  efficiency  can  be  at least
partly subsumed under the criterion of political democracy  because, in the
first instance,  the responsibility  for developing  effective  governmental
programs should almost always devolve on politically accountable  institu-
tions. For example, the national government may need to respond to a de-
pression in ways  never imagined by the founding generation, or a foreign
policy crisis may call for an urgent response that neither the constitutional
text nor accepted practice  explicitly  authorizes. Almost  never, however,
should it be the responsibility  of the courts to specify  a course  of action.
The question, in other words, is not whether the Constitution requires that
something be done, but whether-in light of the concern to permit effec-
tive political democracy,  among other things-the Constitution should be
read to permit or to forbid action that democratic institutions would other-
wise wish to take.'39  As partly  subsumed under  the criterion  of political
democracy,  workability  and efficiency  count  as values  in  constitutional
theory  debates  insofar  as  they  are  likely to be  embraced  as values  by
democratic majorities.
Concerns  about workability  and efficiency  also  get filtered through
the evaluative criterion involving a morally and politically defensible set of
individual rights. Questions of practical workability are relevant to the pre-
cise specification of the rights that people have. 4° In addition,  theories of
the rights that people have (or do not have) may either abet or retard efforts
to promote workability and efficiency,'  and may be judged either admira-
ble or deficient on this basis.
Finally, the criterion of fit may respond to concerns of workability or
efficiency insofar  as notions  of what a constitutional  theory ought  to fit,
and how  tightly,  constrain democratically  sponsored  efforts to promote
those  interests.  Again,  however,  there  is  no  absolute  need  to evaluate
138.  See,  e.g.,  RICHARD  A. POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF LAW  675-752  (5th ed.  1998)
(analyzing  constitutional  doctrines  from  an  economic  perspective);  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  THE
ECONOMICS  OF  JUSTICE 310-407  (1981)  (same);  Richard  A.  Posner,  Free Speech  in an Economic
Perspective,  20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv.  1 (1986)  (applying an economic model to free speech issues).
139.  See  BLACK, supra note  63,  at 52-53  (asserting  that "the  most conspicuous  function  of
judicial  review  may  have  been  that  of legitimizing  rather  than  that  of voiding  the  actions  of
government").
140.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual  Rights and the Powers of  Government, 27 GA. L.
REv. 343,  352-53 (1993); T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories  of  Expression, 40
U. PITr.  L. REv. 519,535-36 (1979).
141.  Compare EPSTEIN,  supra note  1, at 331-34  (defending a scheme  of rights  that generally
accords  with and promotes  interests  in  economic  efficiency),  with  RAwLs,  supra note  74,  at  61
(asserting that basic liberties cannot be sacrificed to promote economic interests).
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constitutional theories  directly in light of interests  in workability and effi-
ciency, even if something is lost in the effort to subsume them under other
values.42
Having  defended  the familiar evaluative  criteria as  capable of em-
bracing most relevant concerns, I would identify just one further factor that
ought to bear on the assessment of competing constitutional theories. This
involves the relative acceptability  of different theories to various members
of the constitutional  community  and the relative  likelihood that any par-
ticular theory might achieve broad acceptance.
Among the aspirations of constitutional theorizing is to identify fair
and acceptable  terms of cooperation among those-including but not lim-
ited to judges-who are involved in implementing the Constitution.'43 The
purpose  of constitutional  theory is largely justificatory.'"  As  a matter of
ideal, constitutional theory would furnish grounds for the exercise or non-
exercise of judicial power that all affected parties could reasonably be ex-
pected to respect. 45 In practice, the demand that everyone should actually
coalesce  on a constitutional  theory,  and accept it as justifying  constitu-
tional outcomes, is too stringent to be realistic;'46 reasonable disagreement
is endemic to free societies.'47 Nonetheless, agreement and even consensus
should remain as defining aspirations for those engaged in constitutional
argument.'48  Justification,  including  constitutional  justification, is princi-
pally a normative concept, but one that cannot be divorced wholly from the
142.  It might, of course, be suggested that interests in promoting the rule of law, democracy,  and
substantive rights  could themselves  be comprehended  by  some  more overarching  value,  such as
"justice" or "human welfare." The question then would be why it is plausible to judge constitutional
theories on the basis of what are at most partial proxies  or surrogates  for this more ultimate value. The
answer to this  question  may have much to  do with contingent features  of American  constitutional
theory and the  need for rival  constitutional  theories  to  satisfy  a descriptive  test of fit.  American
constitutional theory is largely concerned with prescribing how courts should decide cases under the
American Constitution,  and under no descriptively plausible account do courts have a central role  in
ensuring overall distributive justice or in generally  promoting human welfare. See generally CASS  R.
SUNSTEIN,  THa  PARTIAL  CONSTITUTION  (1993)  (discussing the limited set of problems that are either
assigned by the Constitution to courts or are capable of effective judicial resolution).
143.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,  The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REv. 56, 148-51  (1997).
144.  See Strauss, supra  note 69, at 581, 586.
145.  See Richard H. Fallon,  Jr.,  Of Speakable Ethics and Constitutional  Law:  A Review Essay,
56  U. CHI.  L. REv.  1523,  1548-49  (1989);  see also DWORKIN,  LAw's  EMPIRE,supra  note  1, at 93
("Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be to ends in view, no
matter how beneficial  or noble these  ends,  except as  licensed  or required by individual  rights and
responsibilities flowing from past political decisions about when collective force is justified.").
146.  See Fallon, supra note 145, at 1548.
147.  See,  e.g.,  AMY  GUTMANN  &  DENNIS  THOMPSON,  DEMOCRACY  AND  DISAGREEMENT  1
(1996);  JOHN RAwLs, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993).
148.  See Fallon, supra  note  145,  at 1548-51;  see also Michelman,  supra note  1, at 1524-37
(discussing  necessary  conditions  for judicial  decisions  to  be experienced  as consistent  with self-
government).
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target audience of free and equal citizens at whom justification is aimed.49
Accordingly,  all else being equal,  a constitutional theory that offers better
prospects-for achieving broad acceptance should be preferred over a theory
with poorer prospects.
In
FORMAL THEORIES,  SUBSTANTIVE CRITERIA,  AND
THE PERTINENCE  OF WHO  OCCUPIES THE BENCH
So  far, I have  argued  that the  selection  of a constitutional  theory
should be based largely  on instrumental grounds.  Among theories  satisfy-
ing a fit requirement, the best will be that which most optimally promotes
mixed, weighted interests in the rule of law, political democracy,  and  ap-
propriately specified substantive rights. No sooner are these criteria stated,
however, than further questions arise about the kinds of constitutional theo-
ries to which they might be applied. Although Parts I and II of this Article
emphasized  a distinction between text-based and practice-based  theories,
constitutional theories  can be categorized along a number of dimensions.
Another axis of comparison,  also highly pertinent in choosing a constitu-
tional theory, divides  substantive theories from theories that are more for-
mal or methodological.  Which of these two types  of theories ought to be
preferred?
The advantages of substantive theories  are relatively straightforward.
Since  substantive  theories  prescribe  decisions  in  accord  with  specified,
substantive  criteria,  anyone who knows in advance what would count  as
"good" results can test substantive theories by their capacity to support her
preferred pattern of decisions.  By contrast, formal theories present an ap-
parent puzzle:  if an important test of constitutional theories involves their
capacity to define and protect individual rights, how could it be desirable
to adopt a theory with a predominant thrust that is methodological  only? I
suggest that proponents of formal theories must rely at least in part on pre-
dictions about the results  that judges would reach under their approaches.
Such reliance by no means makes formal  theorists unique, however. It is
impossible  to  compare  the relative  virtues  of competing  constitutional
theories without making predictions about who our judges and Justices are
likely to be and about the kinds of decisions that they would make under
alternative specifications of the judicial role.
A.  Substantive and Formal Theories
Substantive  theories  advocate judicial  decision  making pursuant  to
criteria that aim to promote transparent substantive goals. Richard Epstein
149.  Cf  RAwIs,  supra note  147,  at  15,  133-72  (attempting to defend  and justify political
liberalism partly by  reference to  an "overlapping consensus"  of views actually  held by citizens  of
liberal democracies).
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provides an example. 50  His book Takings presents  a substantive  theory,
which he characterizes  as reflecting natural law,'  that mixes  libertarian-
ism with economic efficiency  analysis.'52  Similarly, David Richards  has
propounded a theory under which judges should adjudicate constitutional
issues in accord with Rawlsian liberalism.'53
Unlike the approaches  of Epstein and Richards, however, most con-
stitutional theories tend to be more formal than substantive."M  Rather than
prescribing  decisions in accord with particular substantive  values, formal
theories generically identify  the kinds  of considerations  that judges ought
to weigh and dispute about the extent, if any, to which judges should make
expressly  normative judgments.  Originalists,  for  example,  argue  that
judges generally  should rest their decisions  solely on the original under-
standing of the constitutional text.55 As I have suggested, most originalists
believe that their methodology  will tend to produce substantively attractive
results.15 6 Nonetheless,  in defending their theory, originalists treat the out-
comes that originalism  would yield as less important than the rule of law
and political democracy."  Indeed, it is not always obvious what results an
originalist methodology would generate.
Proceeding  in  similarly abstract and methodological  terms,  Ronald
Dworkin argues that judges should decide cases based on a theory that ra-
tionalizes both constitutional precedent  and the constitutional text, and that
depicts the relevant law in the best moral light, whatever that might be.'58
Although Dworkin is a well-known liberal, he argues that it would be pos-
sible for a judge with conservative beliefs to use his methodological theory
150.  See EPSTEIN, supra note 1.
151.  See id. at 5, 304-05.
152.  See id. at 5. For a critical exposition of Epstein's intermixture of these values, see Thomas
C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution,  41 U. Ms  n L. Rav. 21 (1986).
153.  See RICHARDs,  supra note 1. Epstein defends his theory as fitting the constitutional text, see
EPSmTEnI,  supra note 1, at 19-31,  304 (linking  theory  to text of the Eminent Domain Clause),  while
Richards defends his  as  fitting a mix of text and practice,  see RICHAR  S,  supra note  1, at 283-90,
303-05. Each defends his theory as being consistent with the rule of law. See EPSTEIN, supra  note 1, at
24-25; RicHARDs,supra note 1, at 282-305. In short, both for the most part attempt to fit the criteria of
theoretical  excellence discussed in Part II.
154.  John Ely's theory, which calls for courts to interpret open-ended constitutional provisions in
such  a way as to promote the functioning of political democracy,  would also count as an exception to
this  generalization  if Ely's preferred  conception  of democracy  were, by  no  means  implausibly,
characterized  as a "substantive"  value.  Cf. ELY, supra note  1, at 75 & n.*  (acknowledging that the
political  "participation"  protected by  his theory  "can obviously be regarded  as  a value" that judges
ought to enforce).
155.  See supra notes 17-20  and accompanying  text. I say "generally"  because of the need for
originalism, in some cases,  to accommodate precedent.  See BoRK,  supra note  1, at  155-59;  SCALIA,
supra  note 7, at 139-40.
156.  See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying  text.
157.  See, e.g., BEROER,  supra note 1, at 282-99, 351-96; Bou,  supra note 1, at 131 (arguing for
adherence to the original understanding  and characterizing  liberal  and conservative "revisionism"  as
"equally illegitimate").
158.  See supra  notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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to reach conservative  results.'59  In determining  what would be  the "best"
light in which to cast the law, a conservative judge would draw on her con-
servative moral views.
To cite just one more example, at least some versions of constitutional
"pragmatism"'6°---which I shall refer to as "methodological  pragmatism- ''
are defined  by  the  (negative) methodological  claim  that judges  are  not
bound by  any constitutional  rules  at  all; 6'  liberated  from the restraints
urged  by other theories, judges  should simply decide  cases in whatever
way will produce the best future results.' 62 In singling out methodological
pragmatism as a formal constitutional  theory, I do not mean to claim that
all versions of pragmatism are methodological rather than substantive. Nor
do I deny  that some advocates  of methodological pragmatism  have  also
offered  substantive prescriptions  or  even general  substantive  theories. 6 3
Judge Posner is a case in point. In some writings he has championed  the
position that judges should so decide cases  as to promote wealth maximi-
zation. In his methodologically  pragmatist  work, however, Judge Posner
has argued much more abstractly  that judges should decide  cases in what-
ever way will be best for the future;"64 he specifically puts to one  side the
question of the criteria by which to measure what would count as "best."'65
Methodological  pragmatism, then, is a theory distinct from "wealth maxi-
mization"  or from theories  advancing  other substantive  claims  under the
"pragmatist" mantle. It consists in the bracing, distinctly methodological,
starkly negative claim that judges are not bound by methodological rules.
The  predominance  of relatively  formal  constitutional  theories  is
probably best explained by two considerations. First, anyone who adopts a
159.  See,  e.g.,  DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW, supra note  1,  at  2-3  (arguing  that  the  best
constitutional methodology is one that "brings political morality into the heart of constitutional law,"
but that because the methodology can be used by both liberal and conservative judges, the methodology
of furnishing  a "moral  reading"  is "not,  in  itself, either ...  liberal  or...  conservative");  id. at 8
(distinguishing between  the methodological  claim that  the Constitution  should  be  given  a  "moral
reading"  and his  "own interpretations"  of what,  substantively, would be the best moral reading); see
also Edward  J. McCaffery,  Ronald Dworkin, Inside-Out,  85CALIF.  L.  REV.  1043,  1046  (1997)
(reviewing DWORKIN,  FREEDOM'S  LAW, supra  note  1) (distinguishing between  "Dworkin's interpretive
method, on the one hand, and his own particular instantiations ofthat [method]  ...  on the other").
160.  For an introduction to some of the varieties of pragmatism, see Symposium,  18 CARDozo  L.
REv.  1 (1996);  Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism  in American Legal Thought, 63 S.  CAL.
L. Rav. 1569 (1990).  For an explicit application of pragmatism to constitutional  theory, see Daniel A.
Farber, Legal Pragmatism  and the Constitution,  72 MINN. L. REv.  1331 (1988).
161.  See Richard A.  Posner, Pragmatic  Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO  L. REV.  1, 4 (1996)  (arguing
that judges should make decisions "unchecked  by any need to respect or secure consistency in principle
with what other officials have done" or to follow other methodological rules).
162.  See id.
163.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note  109,  at 531-51; Farber, supra  note  160, at 1366-74 (defending
constitutional  rights to abortion).
164.  See POSNER, supra  note  109, at 387-405; Posner, supra  note  161,  at 3-4.
165.  See,  e.g., Posner, supra  note  161,  at 16  ("I likewise  leave open the criteria for the  'best
results'  for which the pragmatic judge [should be] striving.").
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constitutional  theory  embraces  a set of commitments  against which  she
invites her own future arguments  and actions to be tested for consistency
and inconsistency,  and possibility for dishonesty, fecklessness, or breach of
trust.
166 In this context, substantive theories may call for a greater depth of
precommitment  than many participants  in constitutional  debates  are con-
scientiously prepared to make. It is often difficult to specify in advance
how far particular  substantive ends should be pursued, and what attendant
costs should be accepted, in varied and frequently  unknown factual  con-
texts. By contrast, it may be easier to subscribe to a decision procedure that
reserves substantive judgment.
A second reason for the relative prominence of formal theories proba-
bly involves the perception  that they, more than substantive  theories,  can
be defended  in terms likely to be persuasive with others. People who are
motivated  to reach  agreement often find it easier to agree on fair proce-
dures, or on lists of relevant criteria, than on an ordered  set of substantive
ends that would, once adopted, determine outcomes in previously disputed
cases. 67 This is not to deny that it is often easier to decide on correct re-
sults in particular cases than to determine what justifies those results at the
level of theory. 6
1 My point is only that if we care about consensus on theo-
retical  issues, it may appear more promising to focus  on relatively formal
methodologies  than to enter directly into a debate about substantive ends.
There are good reasons to seek theoretical  consensus. As I have sug-
gested already, theoretical consensus  on fundamental issues is a goal that
ought devoutly to be sought by anyone who cares about American consti-
tutionalism. Reasonable  commonality  about argumentative  premises  and
methodologies  is necessary  to maintain a sense of constitutional  commu-
nity within which disagreements  can be experienced  as reasonable, good-
faith disputes  about the proper application  of principles  that, at some level
of abstraction, are broadly shared.  169 If constitutional reasoning is perceived
as resting  on partisan,  parochial,  or illegitimate  premises,  or as lacking
methodological integrity, its  conclusions can only appear as alien imposi-
tions of force and will.
7 0
Against the background of this threat, affirmations  of reasonable for-
mal theories help  to sustain conversation and to reinforce the sense that
167.  See  RAwLs,  supra note  147,  at 46  (arguing that abstraction  of this  kind  "is  a way  of
continuing public discussion when shared understandings of lesser generality have broken down").
168.  See  Cass R.  Sunstein,  The  Supreme  Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving  Things
Undecided, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 14-21 (1996).
169.  See Fallon,  supra note  145,  at 1548-51;  see also Michelman,  supra note  1, at  1524-37
(discussing  necessary  conditions  for judicial  decisions  to be experienced  as  consistent with self-
government).
170.  Cf. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court,  1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,  97
HARv. L. Rv. 4, 40-44, 53 (1983)  (meditating on the "jurispathic" role of courts in rejecting beliefs
woven into the normative  order of minority  communities and affirming  that judges, in such contexts,
are "people of violence").
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there is enough  common ground to make reasoned  debate possible.  Fur-
ther, the tendering of a formal  theory at least implicitly rejects  the argu-
ments  of more  rigid theories  about the bounds  of legitimate  argument.
Finally,  advocacy of a formal  theory constitutes an implied vow of argu-
mentative  seriousness  and good faith. People's reasonable consistency  in
following their own avowed theories may help sustain a faith that constitu-
tional practice involves a shared commitment to live by principle,  and not
by opportunism, sophistry, and manipulation.
Although there thus may be good reasons to endorse a relatively for-
mal constitutional theory, it is important not to lose sight of the full set of
criteria  by which  constitutional  theories  should be judged.  For  anyone
choosing a constitutional theory, more is at stake than whether a particular
theory will accommodate  her own substantive views  and uncertainties. To
endorse a theory is to commend it to others, who might employ it to reach
quite  different conclusions,  especially if the theory  is  a formal  one  that
contemplates  a wide ambit for moral and political judgments. If constitu-
tional theories  should be evaluated based  on their capacities  to protect a
morally acceptable set of individual rights, is it a plain mistake to endorse a
formal theory, rather than insisting on a more substantive one?
The answer is "not necessarily."1'  Other considerations  aside,'  sev-
eral mediating variables  may help to indicate the practical implications of
even comparatively  formal theories. First, the more tightly a theory pur-
ports  to cabin judgment, the easier it often  will be to identify a theory's
substantive  consequences. For example, although further research may  be
required, it is relatively easier to identify  the general substantive implica-
tions of originalism73  than of methodological pragmatism (to take just one
more example).
Second, even with respect to formal theories that authorize expressly
value-based judicial  decision making,  grounds  for assessing  substantive
implications are by no means wholly lacking. Perhaps the most important
variable  is  the  character  of those  who  are  likely  to  occupy  judicial
171.  Cf.  Fallon, supra note  143  (offering a relatively  formal  and  practice-based  theory  that
characterizes  what  judges  within  our  constitutional  practice  appropriately  do  as  attempting  to
implement the Constitution successfully, rather than searching for the "meaning"  of the Constitution in
every  case); Fallon,  supra note  10  (advancing  a  formal  theory  categorizing  types  of  acceptable
constitutional  arguments and identifying their relationships to one another).
172.  As  noted above, a constitutional theory should be tested against interests in the rule of law
and political democracy, as well as against the concern for substantive justice. With respect to the rule
of law and political  democracy, the implications of a formal constitutional theory  may  be relatively
transparent, though perhaps not wholly free from historical contingency. For example, the realization of
such rule-of-law norms as consistency and predictability  may depend on the extent to which judges, at
any particular time, share relevant values and understandings.  See Fallon, supra  note 72, at 49-50.
173.  See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Political  Function of Originalist  Ambiguity,  19 HARv. J.L. &
PUB.  POL'Y  487, 492 (1996)  (characterizing originalism as "perhaps  most often a political or rhetorical
stalking horse for a set of substantive positions with respect to a relatively  narrow set of constitutional
issues in the current age").
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office:  what backgrounds,  values,  and foibles  will judges  bring to their
deliberations,  and how-for better or for worse-are  their decisions likely
to be affected?  As scholars have emphasized, judges'  relative insulation
from the hurly-burly of politics may encourage them to view matters  dis-
interestedly,  in light of values  that they think are  or ought to be broadly
shared.75 Nonetheless, judges'  and Justices'  personal values, backgrounds,
and  dispositions  cannot  be  abstracted  entirely  from  the picture.  With
enough general, probabilistic knowledge about who our judges and Justices
are likely to be, it often may be possible to anticipate the pattern of judicial
decisions  even under theories  that are  both formal  and relatively  open-
ended (such as Dworkin's theory or methodological pragmatism). 76
Consideration of judges'  likely backgrounds  and values  can also be
relevant in forecasting  results under purportedly more constraining formal
theories, such as originalism. Sophisticated originalists  seldom claim that
their method is perfectly determinate.'I According to Robert Bork, for ex-
ample, the original understanding frequently yields no more than a value or
a first premise, the application of which requires further judgment.7
1 In this
act of judgment, a judge's sense of what is fair or otherwise  desirable is
likely  to  exert  determining  influence. 79  Moreover,  as  others  have
emphasized, originalist judges often may find that historical materials fail
even to determine a uniquely correct rule or principle for judicial applica-
tion.1 80 A particular  difficulty  involves  the question  whether historically
174.  For provocative  comment  on these and related  issues,  see Mark Tushnet,  Constitutional
Interpretation,  Character,  and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV.  747 (1992),  and Paul Brest, Who Decides?,
58 S.  CAL. L. REv.  661 (1985).
175.  See, e.g.,  BICKEL, supra note  1, at 23-28; Wellington,  supra note 40, at 246-47.  Without
always being  explicit  about it, much  of the neo-republican  literature  also  appears  to  rest on  this
premise.  See, e.g., Frank I.  Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100  HARV.  L. REv.  4, 73-77 (1986);  Cass R.  Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public  Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
176.  Richard Posner draws on considerations such  as these in arguing that judges  authorized to
do whatever they think best for the future will produce a desirable pattern  of decisions  as measured
against virtually all relevant criteria:
Judges of the higher American courts are generally picked from the upper tail of population
distribution  in terms of age, education,  intelligence,  disinterest, and sobriety ....  [A]t their
best, American appellate courts are councils of wise elders and it is not completely insane to
entrust them with responsibility for deciding cases in a way that will produce the best results
in the circumstances rather than just deciding cases in accordance with rules created by other
organs of government  ....  although this is what they will be  doing most of the time.
Posner, supra  note  161, at 11-12.
177.  See BORK,  supra  note  1, at 162-63 (acknowledging that "two judges equally devoted to the
original purpose" may disagree about the results of constitutional cases).
178.  See id.
179.  Cf.  BENJAMIN N. CARDozo,  THE  NATURE  OF THE  JUDICIAL PROCESS  12 (1921)  (asserting
that judges characteristically  have "an  underlying  philosophy of life"  including "inherited  instincts,
traditional beliefs, acquired  convictions,"  and "a conception of social needs"  that, "when reasons  are
nicely balanced, must determine where choice shall fall").
180.  See TRIBE  & DORF,  supra  note 1, at 79-88 (framing the problem of determining the "level of
generality"  at  which  legal  principles  should  be  expressed);  Brest,  supra note  17,  at  218-22
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contemplated  applications of constitutional provisions conclusively  deter-
mine constitutional  "meanings."''  For example, Justice Scalia  and Judge
Bork have jousted over whether  the First Amendment  protects only such
speech as the framing generation  specifically  understood to be protected,
or whether the original understanding should be expressed more abstractly
as involving protection of all  speech necessary to the effective functioning
of the political process. 1 82  Judgments about whether the "meaning"  of con-
stitutional provisions should be linked to specific historical expectations, or
instead should be expressed  in more abstract principles,  often seem to re-
flect irreducibly moral or political  assumptions."  Finally, most original-
ists-including both Justice Scalia and Judge Bork-have recognized that
courts  must sometimes,  but not always,  accept  the authority  of judicial
precedent  that  departs  from  the  original  understanding.'"  Determining
when precedent  should be followed  and when it should be rejected is an
inherently value-laden  task, 185 in which a judge's moral and political beliefs
may often prove decisive.
B.  Historical  Contingency and Constitutional  Theory
If  information  about  judges  is  useful  in  gauging  the  practical
implications  of various  constitutional  theories,  then  information  of this
kind should also  matter greatly in assessing  rival theories'  comparative
attractiveness.  Armed with predictions  about how courts  are likely to  de-
cide cases under  alternative role specifications,  we are better  equipped to
(emphasizing  "the  indeterminate  and  contingent  nature  of the  historical  understanding  that  an
originalist historian seeks to achieve").
181.  See, e.g., Brest, supra  note  17, at 220; Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 7,
at 115,  116-27; Mark D. Greenberg & Harry  Litman, The Meaning of Original  Meaning, 86  GEo. L.J.
569 (1998)  (arguing that the original understanding is crucial in determining  meaning, but that original
meaning should not be confused with original applications).
182.  See  Oilman  v.  Evans,  750  F.2d  970,  995-97  (D.C.  Cir.  1984)  (Bork,  J.,  concurring)
(asserting that even  if the Framers did not understand  the First Amendment  to restrict libel  actions,
courts should  adapt doctrine to afford protection  if libel actions  have become a threat  to "the central
meaning of the First Amendment" as  measured by the original  understanding); id. at 1038-39 (Scalia,
J., dissenting in  part) (rejecting  an approach  that permits  doctrinal  "evolution"  in  light of changed
sociological conditions). Others have suggested that the First Amendment was originally understood to
protect substantially less speech than either Judge Bork or Justice Scalia has contemplated. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism,  Freedom of  Expression, and Equal  Protection,  42 OHIO ST. L.J.  261,
287  (1981)  (asserting that the Framers and ratifiers of the First Amendment  "at  most ...  intended it to
prohibit any system of prior restraint and  to modify  the common law of seditious libel")  (citations
omitted).
183.  See  TRIBE & DORF, supra note  1, at 65-80,  97-117  (arguing that judicial value judgment
cannot be  avoided  in  identifying  the level  of generality  at which  constitutional  rights  should  be
specified).
184.  See Bomc, supra note 1, at 155-59;  SCALIA, supra note 7, at 139-40.
185.  Cf BoRKu,  supra note 1, at 158 (observing that the question when to follow non-originalist
precedent is "addressed to the prudence of a court"); SCALIA, supra note  7, at 140 (acknowledging  that
"I  cannot deny  that stare decisis affords  some opportunity  for arbitrariness-though  I attempt  to
constrain my own use of the doctrine by consistent rules").HOW TO CHOOSE  A CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
assess which theories will do better, and which worse, at realizing the rule
of law, political democracy, and substantive rights.
That the anticipated capacities  and characters of judges are relevant to
constitutional theory is  undoubtedly a familiar point. Perhaps no one has
ever thought otherwise. To my mind, however, this banality has implica-
tions that are not always, or perhaps even widely, recognized.
To begin with, there is no reason to think that the character and qual-
ity of judges, and their relative capacities  to make sound judgments of po-
litical morality, will be historical constants." 6 The judges of one era may
tend to be more parochial in outlook, or more thoughtful and deliberative,
than  the judges  of another. Judicial appointments  and attendant judicial
tendencies  may be more crassly politicized in some times than in others.'
The federal judiciary of one period may have accepted an agenda that ac-
cords with substantive justice  and that lends itself to successful judicial
implementation, whereas the judiciary of another era may cling to quixotic
aspirations that defy consistent implementation. 8'
If the choice of constitutional theories is  aimed at achieving the best
realization of interests in the rule of law, democracy,  and individual rights,
it may be a mistake to assume that there is one best constitutional theory
for all time.'89 Just as the nature of the judiciary may change, so may the
surrounding character of American politics and the orientation of dominant
political movements toward both the Constitution and substantive justice.
As changes  occur, the constitutional theory that would work best to satisfy
the relevant criteria in one era may not work best in another.
It may help to be slightly more concrete. Many New Deal liberals es-
poused a constitutional  theory that demanded  great judicial  deference to
politically accountable  decisionmakers. 9 ' ° Adhering to such a theory, Felix
Frankfurter found himself frequently out of step with the Warren  Court,
186.  See Tushnet, supra  note 174, at 756-63  (contrasting the Court that decided Brown v. Board
of  Education, and the range of experiences of its members, with the current Justices  and their range of
experiences).
187.  Cf SCALIA, supra  note 7, at 46 (arguing that processes of judicial appointment and decision
have become increasingly politicized and are likely to continue to be so).
188.  The  Supreme  Court of the  Lochner era  furnished  a prominent  example  of the latter
phenomenon. The defining doctrines of that era not only rested on normatively  dubious premises, but
also contained "seeds  of self-contradiction,"  LAURENCE  H. TRIBE,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW
574 (2d ed.  1988),  that made consistent enforcement  impossible, see id. at 567  (noting that  "more
statutes in fact withstood due process attack" during the Lochner era "than succumbed to it"); see also
id. n.2. By contrast, the Court led by John Marshall successfully  implemented a nation-building agenda
that subsequent generations have widely applauded. See  e.g.,  ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY,  THE AMERICAN
SUPREME  COURT  54-80 (1960);  WILLIAM  BENNETT  MUNRO,  THE  MAKERS  OF  THE  UNWRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 53-81 (1930).
189.  Cf.  PAUL  W.  KAHN,  LEGITIMACY  AND  ISTORY  (1992)  (describing four  "models"  of
constitutional  discourse and decision making that have developed in response to challenges presented
by different constitutional eras).
190.  See ANDRE w L. KAUFMAN,  CARnozo 534 (1998).
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whose implicit constitutional  theory defined the judicial liberalism of an-
other age. 9'  Perhaps New Deal deference  can be reconciled with  Warren
Court activism based  on differences  between the defining  constitutional
issues of the two eras."9  But it is also possible that a constitutional theory
prescribing judicial deference to the political branches was appropriate for
the New Deal era, in which democratically  validated experiment was nec-
essary to respond to economic emergency  and advance  substantive justice,
but was not right for the Warren era, in which historical forces  made the
federal judiciary an apt and possibly necessary  instrument of reform. 9 3  Or
maybe the value-based decision making of the Warren era violated appro-
priate, formal limits on the judicial role, and formally similar value-based
decision making by the Rehnquist Court is justified today both  to correct
depredations  wrought by the Warren Court and  to restore substantive co-
herence to the law.
Whatever conclusion anyone might reach,  possibilities such as these
cannot be dismissed out of hand. Some degree of instrumental  calculation
becomes inescapable  once it is  recognized that competing  constitutional
theories should be assessed under criteria that refer not only to the rule of
law and democracy, but also to acceptably specified individual rights.
C.  Meeting an Objection
My suggestion that which constitutional theory is "best" may depend
on historically  relative considerations,  including the varying character  of
the judiciary, invites an obvious and formidable objection:  even if the cir-
cumstances of adjudication change and the quality of the judiciary varies, it
does not follow that people should alter their constitutional theories based
on  shifting  instrumental  calculations.  Rather,  it might be  said,  anyone
ought to adopt whatever theory would be best for all of constitutional time,
taking into account that the chosen theory should be applied across  diverse
historical  circumstances  by judges and Justices  who differ in quality  and
normative outlook.
191.  See Wallace Mendelson,  The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the  Work of Holmes,
Brandeis,  and Frankfurter,  31 VAND.  L. REv. 71, 80 (1978).
192.  Cf. ELY, supra  note 1, at 73-75  (arguing that the Warren  Court's agenda  largely involved
correcting defects in the political process and that its approach was not inconsistent with a philosophy
counseling judicial deference  in cases not involving process defects).
193.  Cf. ARCHIBALD  Cox,  THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME  COURT IN AMERICAN  GOVERNMENT  35
(1976):
In the 1930s a modest view of the judicial function in constitutional interpretation fitted
the new generation's desire for progressive social and economic  reform. The legislative  and
executive  branches were engaged  in the redistribution  of power  and the protection of the
disadvantaged  and  distressed.  By  the  1950s  the political  atmosphere  had  changed.  The
legislative  process,  even  at  its  best,  became resistant  to  libertarian,  humanitarian,  and
egalitarian  impulse.  At  worst, the legislatures became repressive,  in the libertarian  view,
because  of the Cold  War, increased  crime,  the  fear of social disorder, and,  perhaps,  the
strength of established economic and political power.
[Vol. 87:535HOW TO CHOOSE  A CONSTITUIONAL THEORY
Although  offering the apparent  advantage  of principled  constancy,
this view loses plausibility  when tested  against the long  and continuing
history of American constitutionalism.  Our constitutional system is organ-
ized around a text-much of it written in highly general language-that is
difficult to amend by formal means and that has attained near sacred status
in the surrounding culture."  Within a constitutional tradition such as ours,
it is both natural and desirable that courts should assume different stances
toward the written constitutional  text, and its interpretation,  at different
times. Professor Kahn, for example, has argued that whereas  the Supreme
Court of the John Marshall era viewed the Constitution as the reflection of
political scientific insights that the Court should also strive to implement,1 9 5
subsequent generations found the political assumptions of the Framers and
ratifiers to be increasingly alien and constitutional norms to be increasingly
needful of interpretation, adaptation, and extension. 1 9 6  As the constitutional
community's  relation  to the written Constitution changed,  Kahn argues,
interpretive methodology  also changed'--as I, among many others, 198 be-
lieve that it should.
Some, notably the originalists, resist the notion that interpretive meth-
odology  should alter over time. As Justice Scalia pithily puts it, the "whole
purpose" of the Constitution is to "prevent change,"'1 99 or at least to make
change difficult. In particular,  Article V  specifies  a stringent mechanism
for constitutional amendment.'  But while Justice Scalia resists the notion
that the methodology of constitutional adjudication  should ideally evolve,
194.  For a provocative elaboration of the idea that the Constitution functions as the central text in
an American "civil religion,"  see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL  FAITH (1988).
195.  See KAHN,  supra  note  189, at 23-31.
196.  See id.  at 46-133.
197.  See id.  at 23-170.
198.  According  to Lawrence  Lessig,  for  example,  it becomes  necessary  for constitutional
interpreters  of remote  generations  to  "translate"  the  meaning  of principles  endorsed  by  the
Constitution's Framers and ratifiers in order to apply those principles faithfully and sensibly in contexts
that the parties to the original understanding never contemplated.  See Lessig, supra  note  1, at 1211-47;
Lawrence Lessig, Understanding  Changed  Readings: Fidelity  and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REv. 395,446-
72(1995).
199.  SCALIA,  supra  note 7, at 40.
200.  See  U.S.  CoNsT.  art. V (requiring that constitutional  amendments be proposed by either
two-thirds of both Houses of Congress or by a Convention called by two-thirds of the states, and that
they be ratified by three-fourths of the states). For arguments that the mechanism provided in Article V
is not exclusive, see  1 AcI EP  AN,  supra  note 1, at 44-45; 2 AcKEaN, supra note 1, at 69-95,  115;
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed:  Constitutional  Amendment Outside Article V, 94
COLUM.  L. REv.  457 (1994);  Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia  Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V,  55 U. Cm. L. REv.  1043, 1054 (1988). The views of Professors Ackerman  and Amar
have been sharply criticized, however, and it remains the "orthodox" view, 2 ACKERmAN, supra note 1,
at 115, that the Article V mechanism is exclusive.  See, e.g., Fried, supra  note 109, at 17-33; Laurence
H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form  Method in Constitutional
Interpretation,  108 HAIv. L. REV.  1221,  1280-86 (1995).  For valuable discussion of a variety of issues
involving the practice of constitutional amendment, see  RESPONDING  TO IMPERFECTION:  THE THEORY
AND  PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL  AMENDMENT,  supra  note 26.
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even he accepts that constitutional theory must adapt in practice.2"'  Many
entrenched doctrines depart from original understandings; 22 governmental
structures  and  private  expectations  have  taken  root  in  non-originalist
precedent. 3  Under the circumstances,  Justice  Scalia acknowledges  that
courts must develop  a theory that accommodates  the timeless  originalist
ideal with respect for stare decisis.M
Another consideration  supports  the view  that the  attractiveness  of
constitutional  theories may be historically relative. The project of imple-
menting the Constitution, through adjudication  and otherwise, is inherently
collective; coordination is needed to achieve the benefits of the rule of law,
effective political democracy,  and the enjoyment of an acceptable regime
of rights. 5 In these circumstances,  to endorse a constitutional  theory is to
commend it to others, with reasonable hope that some will accept the the-
ory as a basis for coordinated decision making. In offering commendation,
the proponent of a constitutional  theory should act on sincerely held val-
ues. Nonetheless,  a crucial  aim of constitutional  theorizing  is to identify
interpretive principles  that others  can reasonably  be asked to accept.TM  As
the historical context changes, so will the relative plausibility of alternative
theories  as "focal points" for widespread  acceptance  and  coordinated  ac-
tion."°  And as changes  occur in various theories'  prospects for gaining ac-
ceptance, so may the relative attractiveness of the theories themselves.
IV
WHO NEEDS CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY?
Claims such as these may appear to verge on constitutional, or at least
constitutional  theoretical,  nihilism. If the best constitutional  theory  may
vary from era to era, why should it not also vary from case to case? Indeed,
if the justifications  for adopting a  constitutional  theory  are substantially
instrumental-aimed  at promoting  the rule of law,  democracy,  and  sub-
stantive justice-why  not  simply  dispense  with  constitutional  theory
201.  See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 139-40  (characterizing a theory of stare decisis as "a pragmatic
exception to" his originalist philosophy).
202.  See supra  note 60 and accompanying  text.
203.  See BORK, supra note 1, at 158.
204.  See SCALIA, supra note 7, at 139-40.
205.  See Fallon,  supra  note  143,  at 148-51.
206.  See id. at 109-10  (arguing that "the ideal of constitutional  law requires willingness among
those charged with implementing the law to accept reasonable,  if not always  ideal, premises as bases
for coordinated decisionmaking").
207.  The concept  of  "focal  points,"  referring  to  potential  solutions  to  coordination  or other
problems  that, for cultural or psychological reasons, are peculiarly salient and thus especially  capable
of supporting  agreements  and coordinated  behavior, originated with  THOMAS  C.  SCHELLINo,  THE
STRATEGY  OF  CONFLICT  58-80  (1960).  On the relevance of focal points  to constitutional theory, see
Fallon, supra  note  143, at 110; and Strauss, supra  note  1, at 910-13.
[Vol. 87:535HOW TO CHOOSE A  CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
altogether and decide each case in whatever way would best promote those
ultimate values?
This Part responds to these challenges. Against the claims  of meth-
odological pragmatists, I maintain that judges and Justices can better serve
underlying values if they accept norms of the kind that traditional constitu-
tional theories defend. I then argue that although judges  and Justices need
not expressly  choose a constitutional theory, neither can they avoid theo-
retical  commitments.  In  giving reasons  for their decisions, judges  and
Justices  necessarily rely  on assumptions  about the methods  of reasoning
that courts ought to pursue. For a judge or Justice to appeal to inconsistent
assumptions from one case to the next would breed cynicism. The ideal of
judicial reason,  as distinct  from power or will, implies an  obligation  of
methodological integrity.
A.  The Perils of  Pragmatism
The  suggestion  that  there  is  no  need  for constitutional  theory-
conceived  as a  set of prescriptions  that  should apply unvaryingly  to all
constitutional cases  (whether within or across constitutional eras)-is by
no means  an  idle  one. This  is essentially  the  claim  of methodological
pragmatism,  as championed  by Judge Richard  Posner and others."8  Ac-
cording  to Judge Posner, courts  should decide each  case in the way that
will have  the best consequences,  "unchecked by any felt duty to  secure
consistency in principle with what other officials have done in the past '2
or to adhere to other methodological rules that are more constraining than
an open-ended charge to do what is "best" for the future. 2"'
In assessing the challenge of methodological pragmatists, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that methodological pragmatism is itself a constitu-
tional theory, 21 1 which competes with other theories in its claims about how
judges  should  decide  cases.  Accordingly,  methodological  pragmatism
should be tested against the same criteria as other, more traditional  theo-
ries. The relevant question is whether the current state of affairs, in which
the prescriptions of more traditional theories are at best unevenly observed,
would be improved if methodological pragmatism  achieved broad adher-
ence.
In my view, acceptance  of methodological  pragmatism would make
things worse, not better. In offering traditional theories, theorists implicitly
claim  that, by realigning  current practices  in  specified  ways,  we could
more fully realize some mixture of values associated with the rule of law,
208.  See, e.g., Posner,  supra  note 1; Posner, supra  note 161; Farber, supra  note 160.
209.  Posner, supra  note 161,  at 4.
210.  See id  at 4, 15-16.
211.  Cf.  Posner, supra  note 1, at 10 (characterizing Cass Sunstein's theory-which  is discussed
infra at notes 215-220 and accompanying text-as an "anti-theory").
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democracy,  and individual rights. By inviting judges to act on their per-
sonal  views  of what would  make  the  future  better, pragmatism  would
authorize judicial behavior that offends  both rule-of-law  and  democratic
values;  it would  also  devalue  the  notion  of  a constitutional  "right.2 2
Pragmatists  can, of course, reply that judges should take these considera-
tions into  account  in determining what would be best for the future,  all
things considered.213 Pragmatist judges might therefore follow established
rules except where it would be very costly to do so, and they might write
disingenuous  opinions purporting  to accept the authority of past decisions
even when they were really setting out in new directions that they thought
better for the future. In my view, however, basic assumptions  underlying
both political democracy  and the rule of law require judicial truth-telling.2'4
Even if a general norm of truth-telling could somehow be pragmatically
justified, I would regard it as a mistake to trust judges with explicit discre-
tion to do whatever they thought best and to endow  their judgments with
the majority-trumping force of constitutional law.
B.  Do Judges  Need Constitutional  Theory?
A related argument against traditional constitutional  theory focuses
specifically on whether constitutional theory is valuable to judges. As Cass
Sunstein  points  out,  the  Supreme  Court  has  never  made  an  "official
choice" among competing  theories? 5 Arguing "[a]gainst theories, [a]gainst
rules,"2 ' 6 Sunstein maintains that judges  are unlikely  to have any  special
aptitude for theory.2 17 He further asserts that we are frequently likely to get
better decisions if Supreme Court Justices resolve issues on a case-specific,
shallowly theorized basis.21 8 According to Sunstein, the Court should avoid
entanglement with large, confusing, and often divisive abstractions, such as
the claims of constitutional theories. 219
212.  See DWORKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE, supra note  1, at  152 ('Pragmatism...  denies  that people
ever have legal rights; it takes the bracing view that they are never entitled  to what would otherwise be
worse for the community .... ").
213.  See  id. ("Pragmatists have  an  explanation ...  of why the language  of rights  and  duties
figures  in legal  discourse.  They argue, on pragmatic  grounds, that judges  must sometimes act  as if
people had legal rights, because acting that way will serve society better in the long run.").
214.  See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial  Candor,  100 HARV.  L. REV.  731, 746-47, 750
(1987) (observing that paternalistic dissembling would be unacceptable to the public and that judicial
candor is necessary  to measure judges' fidelity to law).
215.  Sunstein, supra  note  168, at  13.
216.  Id. at 14.
217.  See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,  LEGAL REASONING  AND  POLITICAL  CONFLICT 46 (1996) (citing the
"limited  capacities of judges"  as  a reason  why constitutional  adjudication  should generally  turn on
"low-level principles" rather than abstract, general theories).
218.  See id. at 35-48.
219.  See id. at 171-82; cf  id. at 56-57  ("Judges should adopt  a presumption rather than a taboo
against high-level theorization.").
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I agree with Professor Sunstein that a judge does not need a fully ar-
ticulated  theory in order  to do her job."  A judge or Justice  can proceed
case by  case. Indeed,  in the best tradition  of the common law, she may
have good reason to avoid theoretical commitments that may prove unten-
able in light of events and arguments that she cannot foresee. Nonetheless,
a judge's work cannot be innocent of constitutional theory, nor can a judge
escape obligations of theoretical consistency.
For a judge as much as for anyone else, it is impossible to engage in
constitutional argument without making at least implicit assumptions  about
appropriate methodology.21  For example, to adopt an  argument based  on
precedent is to presuppose  the validity of a theory that makes precedent at
least relevant and possibly controlling. Theoretical commitments are also
implied when a judge or Justice either appeals  to the original understand-
ing or rejects such appeals.
Moreover, in offering arguments  that reflect theoretical  assumptions,
participants  in constitutional debates  assume obligations of consistency.'
Suppose that Justice  A, dissenting in one case,  argues  that the Supreme
Court is bound to follow the original understanding  of constitutional lan-
guage, but that Justice A herself refuses to be bound by the original under-
standing in another case.  Or suppose that Justice B criticizes Justice A for
deciding  an unnecessary  constitutional  issue, but then herself decides  an
unnecessary  issue in a subsequent case.  Unless the cases are persuasively
distinguishable, Justices  A and B have  both fallen short of professional
ideals. Judicial inconsistency affronts the rule of law. A substantive injus-
tice may also occur if relevant similar cases are treated differently. More
insidiously,  a failure  of judges  and Justices  to behave consistently  may
breed a destructive, spiraling cynicism. The practice of constitutional adju-
dication depends for its integrity on an assumption of good faith:
There  must be a  sense  that  [judges  and Justices  with  opposing
views]  are advancing  legal arguments because they believe in them
deeply and not as a stratagem for imposing their will on the law.
There must be a sense that reasons matter more than results. The
power to interpret carries the responsibility  of good faith and self-
denial. When these  are destroyed,  nothing  remains but counting
votes and the exercise of raw power.
220.  Indeed,  as  Sunstein  points  out,  "Justices  O'Connor,  Kennedy,  Souter,  Ginsburg,  and
Breyer"--arguably "the analytical heart of the current Court"--have not subscribed individually to any
readily identifiable interpretive methodology. Sunstein, supra  note  168, at 14.
221.  See DwoRxuN, LAw's ENMPE, supra  note 1, at 90; Fallon, supra  note 10, at 1234-35.
222.  See  GUTMANN  & THOMPSON,  supra note  147,  at 81-82  (arguing that "civic  integrity"
requires "consistency in speech" and "consistency between speech and action").
223.  EDwARD LAzAiuS,  CLOSED CHAMBERs  249 (1998).
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Again,  by  suggesting that judges  and  Justices  have  obligations  of
methodological consistency,22 4 I do not imply that each needs to, or indeed
should, begin  by endorsing  a comprehensive  constitutional  theory.  I do
mean to claim, however, that issues of constitutional  theory are unavoid-
able, especially for judges. Every judge and Justice therefore needs  at least
parts  of a constitutional  theory, even if not a complete one. Commitments
to theoretical tenets occur willy-nilly in the decision of cases. 225
V
QUESTIONS ON  THE AGENDA
Even if the agenda of constitutional theory remains vital, for judges as
much as for the rest of us, troubling questions arise once we recognize that
theoretical  approaches must be assessed partly on predictive  or instrumen-
tal grounds. These include questions about the appropriate time horizon to
consider in choosing  and advocating  a constitutional  theory  (for anyone
disposed to do so explicitly) and about who should make the choice under
conditions  characterized  by reasonable  disagreement.  I shall  offer only
brief comments on these questions, which I take up in reverse order.
A.  Who Should Choose?
Under  current  circumstances,  the choice  of a constitutional  theory
must  be made by  individual participants  in constitutional  debates.  The
People of the United States have not made an authoritative  decision in this
matter, nor has the Supreme Court. Within reasonable bounds, the People
of the United States, by constitutional amendment,  could prescribe a con-
stitutional theory to be applied by courts (and other officials). I recognize
that there  is something  paradoxical  about this claim.  Obvious  questions
are,  first, what theory  should  courts use in interpreting  the hypothesized
amendment asserting that they should follow particular interpretive prac-
tices  and,  second, how  could the choice of that logically prior theory be
224.  The obligation of consistency  is necessarily  provisional  and  defeasible.  The  constraints
established by  constitutional  theory  are justified  by  reference  to what I  have  called  "legitimacy
criteria,"  but, as I have noted,  the legitimacy  criteria themselves are always subject to challenge within
the practice of constitutional  law. See supra text accompanying  note  75. As  a result, the characteristic
methodology  of constitutional  theory  must be  one  analogous  to  Rawls's  concept  of  "reflective
equilibrium,"  see RAwLs, supra  note 74, at 20-22, in which an acceptable balance is sought among the
specification  of relevant  legitimacy  criteria,  a constitutional  theory  or  methodology,  and  the
consequences  of application of the constitutional theory in any particular case. The felt unacceptability
of a particular outcome can, in principle, always trigger a reassessment  and possibly a readjustment of
anyone's  theory,  and a matching  change  in the specification of applicable legitimacy  criteria,  which
would result in a new reflective equilibrium.
225.  See Ronald Dworkin, In Praise  of Theory, 29 ARiz.  ST. L. J. 353, 354 (1997)  ("In practice,
you cannot think about the correct answer  to questions of law unless you have thought through or are
ready to think through a vast over-arching theoretical system .... ").
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justified? Isn't the effort to establish the validity of any interpretive theory
subject to a problem of infinite regress? 226
In response  to questions such as these, I agree that appeal must ulti-
mately be made  to anterior conventions,  practices,  and  norms,  some  of
which transcend,  and cannot themselves  be justified by, positive law. I as-
sume, however, that the relevant practices include those of linguistic usage,
within which  a constitutional  amendment's  central  applications  can be
largely incontrovertible.  I also assume that strong  normative  arguments,
rooted in premises about the fair allocation of political power, would sup-
port  respecting  the  dictates  of  relatively  contemporaneous
Constitution-amending  supermajorities. As  matters  now  stand, however,
the People of the United States have not recently (or historically, for that
matter) established  a  clear set of interpretive  rules  that are  binding  on
courts.
If a Supreme Court majority should  ever hold that the Constitution
requires  a particular  interpretive theory,  its ruling  would  also bind  the
lower courts. But the Court's decision, while "final,"  would not therefore
be infallible;  it would remain  open  to dissenting Justices  and critics  to
protest that the Court had erred and to seek reversal of its mandate. Again,
however,  although the Justices  sometimes  engage  in expressly constitu-
tional theoretical  debates, 7 the Court has not formally endorsed any single
theory."
Amid the flux of current practice, the choice of a constitutional theory
has what Ronald Dworkin characterizes  as an irreducibly  "protestant"  as-
pect.22 9 Among the constitutional theories that fit acceptably well with the
constitutional text or prevailing practice, each person must decide for her-
self which would best promote the rule of law, political democracy,  and
substantive justice. But if choice is in one sense protestant, the decision
also has a collective or communal focus."ao  The project  of implementing
226.  Cf. STANLEY  FISH,  DOING  WHAT COMES  NATURALLY  121  (1989)  (arguing  that because
"rules are texts," which "are in need of interpretation,"  they "cannot themselves serve as constraints on
interpretation").
227.  See, e.g., Planned  Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.  833,  846-53,  951-53  (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting), 979-81  (Scalia, J., dissenting) (1992) (involving disputes about the standards for legitimate
decision-making under the "substantive"  aspect of the Due Process Clause and about the requirements
of stare decisis); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.  110, 122-30 (plurality opinion),  132 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring),  137-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (1989)  (disputing the role of tradition in substantive due
process adjudication).
228.  See Sunstein, supra note 168,  at 13.
229.  DwoRKiN, LAW'S Em.iRE, supra note 1, at 413 (associating law with "a protestant attitude
that makes each citizen responsible for imagining what his society's public commitments to principle
are, and what those commitments require in new circumstances").
230.  For criticism of Dworkin's theory of law on the ground that it is excessively protestant in its
characterization  of the judicial role  and pays insufficient  heed  to  law's collective  and communal
aspects,  see Richard H. Fallon,  Jr.,  Reflections on Dworkin and the Two  Faces of Law, 67 NOTRE
DAAn L. REv. 553,559-66 (1991).
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the
Constitution,  and thereby realizing  the rule of law, political  democracy,
and protection of substantive  rights, is inherently  a shared  one. 1  which
requires  coordinated  action  based  on mutually  acceptable  premises.  All
else being equal, one theory should therefore be preferred to another if it is
more consonant with widely-shared  values  or has better prospects  of at-
taining broad acceptance.s 2
B.  What Are the Appropriate  Time Horizons?
Although the choice  of a constitutional  theory  should  be partly  in-
strumental, it should not be crassly  opportunistic. The aspiration is to  es-
tablish the best attainable terms of cooperation in a collective enterprise.
Too many changes of position in a short time span would frustrate, rather
than promote, interests in fostering cooperativeness, promoting respect for
judicial  decisions as the outcome  of fair and reasoned  deliberative proc-
esses, and sustaining the rule of law.sa
The question  of appropriate  time horizons is therefore  an important
one, but one that can only be addressed in generalities.  At a minimum, the
frame of reference needs to be broad enough to separate overarching issues
concerning the judicial role from interests in securing the optimal outcome
in  any particular  case  or set of cases.  This distinction  is far from crisp.
Nonetheless,  it situates  constitutional  theory  where  it ought to be  situ-
ated:  removed from the abstract philosophical enterprise  of seeking pure,
timeless, moral, and political  truths, but separated also from the issue-by-
issue posturing and trading that often characterize partisan,  electoral poli-
tics. In evaluating  and endorsing constitutional theories, anyone should be
231.  See Fallon, supra  note  143, at 148-51.
232.  Cf.  id. at  109-10  (arguing  that  coordination  interests  in  constitutional  law  provide  a
powerful  reason  to  accept  "the  result  best situated  to  win  majority  acceptance  as  a  reasonable
accommodation of competing considerations").
233.  The interest  in  fostering  cooperativeness  raises  the  question whether,  in  abandoning  a
constitutional theory for substantially instrumental reasons, anyone-especially a judge or a Justice  of
the Supreme Court-should feel obliged  to acknowledge those reasons candidly in defending a chosen
alternative. My inclination is to believe that reasons should be given,  and that the reasons  given must
be honestly believed, but that if these standards  are met, it may not always be necessary  to make public
acknowledgement  of all relevant  reasons.  See Shapiro,  supra note  214, at  736  ("The  problem  of
[judicial]  candor ...  arises only when the individual judge  writes or supports a statement  he does not
believe to be so."). Taking a somewhat more stringent position, Professor Monaghan  has suggested that
a judge,  in  writing  an opinion,  has an  obligation  to  refer to  all  motivating  considerations:  "[i]f
justifications  cannot be stated in the opinion, they should not be relied upon in entering the judgment."
Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Supreme Court Opinions Seriously, 39 MD. L. REv.  1, 25 (1979).  In my
view, however, it should suffice for a judge or Justice to announce that she has rejected a constitutional
theory because, in light of experience, it had become clear that the theory (if generally followed) would
be inferior to some other theory  in satisfying mixed, weighted interests in promoting  the rule of law,
political  democracy, and individual rights. I see no need-in this case or more generally-for a judge
or Justice to state every intermediate premise on which she relies in applying a publicly acknowledged
and defended standard to reach a publicly stated conclusion.
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prepared  to accept at least  some unwanted  practical  implications  of her
own, conscientiously developed theory.'
CONCLUSION
We should assess constitutional theories  in light of their capacity to
promote the rule of law, political democracy,  and a scheme of individual
rights consonant with substantive justice. The last of these criteria, in par-
ticular,  is substantive  rather than  formal. For those who  would choose  a
constitutional  theory,  ultimate  questions  of political  morality  therefore
cannot  be avoided. But neither  can the choice of a constitutional  theory
occur solely by reference to ideals. A crucial practical question is how any
particular theory  would probably be  employed-for good or for ill-by
those who are likely to be judges in particular historical contexts.
In light of the complexity of the issues on which choice of a constitu-
tional  theory  appropriately depends,  many will wish to avoid opting  de-
finitively for one theory and renouncing all others. They will instead prefer
a case-by-case approach,  similar to that of common law judges. This can
indeed be a responsible  stance. Nonetheless,  taking positions on issues of
constitutional theory is ultimately unavoidable. It is impossible to engage
in constitutional  argument without  making methodological  assumptions.
Moreover, anyone who engages in good-faith argumentation  assumes obli-
gations  of methodological  consistency.  The enterprise  of constitutional
justification requires consistent application  of fair standards of valid argu-
ment.
To recognize that a constitutional theory should be chosen partly on
instrumental  grounds  is, therefore, not to license unprincipled manipula-
tions. Once adopted, a constitutional theory ought to impose constraints on
those who accept it. Nonetheless,  it would reflect a deep mistake-a mis-
understanding of what constitutional theory is for-not to evaluate consti-
tutional  theories  based  on  the results  that  they  are  likely  to  produce.
234.  On  the  circumstances  under  which  the  results  prescribed  by  a  theory  might  be  so
unacceptable as to trigger a reconsideration and possibly a rejection of the theory itself, see supra  note
224.
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